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Motivated by the dynamic assortment offerings and item pricings occurring in e-commerce, we study a
general problem of allocating finite inventories to heterogeneous customers arriving sequentially. We analyze
this problem under the framework of competitive analysis, where the sequence of customers is unknown and
does not necessarily follow any pattern. Previous work in this area, studying online matching, advertising,
and assortment problems, has focused on the case where each item can only be sold at a single price, resulting
in algorithms which achieve the best-possible competitive ratio of 1-1/e.
In this paper, we extend all of these results to allow for items having multiple feasible prices. Our algo-
rithms achieve the best-possible weight-dependent competitive ratios, which depend on the sets of feasible
prices given in advance. Our algorithms are also simple and intuitive; they are based on constructing a class
of universal “value functions” which integrate the selection of items and prices offered.
Finally, we test our algorithms on the publicly-available hotel data set of Bodea et al. (2009), where there
are multiple items (hotel rooms) each with multiple prices (fares at which the room could be sold). We find
that applying our algorithms, as a “hybrid” with algorithms which attempt to forecast and learn the future
transactions, results in the best performance.
1. Introduction
In this paper we study a general online resource allocation problem, motivated by dynamic assort-
ment and pricing in revenue management. Consider an airline website selling parallel flights, i.e.
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2different flights which depart from the same origin to the same destination around the same time.
Each flight corresponds to an item which could be sold, and its seat capacity corresponds to the
unreplenishable starting inventory of that item. Each flight has multiple fare classes (e.g. Economy,
Basic Economy) which correspond to prices at which that item could be sold. We will refer to this
collection of initial information (items, inventories, prices) as the setup.
Over the booking horizon, heterogeneous customers sequentially arrive to the airline’s website.
We assume that the airline can reliably estimate each customer’s choice probabilities from historical
data. That is, upon a customer’s arrival, for any combination of items and prices that could be
shown, the stochastic distribution of how the customer would choose among those items/prices
is given. The customer is assumed to choose at most one item and one price, as the flights are
parallel. The customer could also choose to make no purchase. Given the choice probabilities, the
airline selects an assortment of items and corresponding prices to show the customer, where items
with zero remaining inventory cannot be shown. The customer’s decision is realized immediately
afterward, and if she makes a purchase, then the airline earns the corresponding price as revenue,
and depletes one unit of inventory of the corresponding item. The airline wants to maximize its
cumulative revenue earned before the booking horizon is over (or all the flights are full).
We study this problem under the framework of competitive analysis, where the sequence of
customers to arrive over the booking horizon is unknown and does not necessarily follow any
pattern. Instead, the airline seeks to have a good relative performance on all possible sequences.
It offers assortments and pricings using a (possibly randomized) online algorithm, which can make
decisions based on only the setup and the arrival sequence/purchase realizations seen so far. For
c≤ 1, the online algorithm is said to be c-competitive, or achieve a competitive ratio of c, if
inf
arrival sequences A
E[ALG(A)]
OPT(A) ≥ c, (1)
where E[ALG(A)] denotes the algorithm’s expected revenue on arrival sequence A, and OPT(A)
denotes the value of an optimum which knows the entirety of A in advance. In this paper, we will
allow the competitive ratio guarantee to be setup-dependent ; that is, the value of c in (1) can be a
3function of the items, their starting inventories, and prices. We are interested in online algorithms
which achieve the best-possible competitive ratios for various families of setups.
1.1. Overview of Result, and Relation to Previous Results
For setups where each item has a single fare class, the competitive ratio of the above problem has
been analyzed extensively under many streams of literature, which we review below.
1. Online Assortment: If each item has a single price, then the above problem formulation is
exactly the online assortment problem of Golrezaei et al. (2014). The authors use an algo-
rithm which judiciously “balances” between offering different items, based on their remaining
inventory levels. They show, among other results, that their algorithm is (1−1/e)-competitive
in the asymptotic regime. That is, their value of c in (1) depends on the smallest starting
inventory amount in the setup, and approaches 1− 1/e as all starting inventories approach
∞. Without large starting inventories, this problem has also been studied in the special case
where all offered assortments must have size 1, in which case it becomes the online matching
with stochastic rewards problem (Mehta and Panigrahi 2012, Mehta et al. 2014).
2. Online Vertex-weighted Matching: Consider the special case of the problem where the
outcome of any assortment offering is deterministic, and given upon the customer’s arrival. In
this case, we know the maximum (possibly 0) a customer is willing to pay for each item, and
our decision can be reduced to selecting an item to offer to the customer at her maximum-
willingness-to-pay (we can also offer no item). We will refer to this problem as the deterministic
case; it can be viewed as an online weighted matching problem.
If each item is restricted to have a single price, then we get the online vertex-weighted
matching problem of Aggarwal et al. (2011). The authors develop an algorithm which ran-
domly “ranks” the items and matches higher-ranked items first, and show that it is (1−1/e)-
competitive. Their result generalizes the classical result of Karp et al. (1990) for the unweighted
online bipartite matching problem (where all items have the same price).
43. Adwords: The Adwords problem of Mehta et al. (2007) is central to online advertising and fea-
tures budget-constrained bidders instead of inventory-constrained items. It also uses the idea
of “balancing”, between the bidders’ budgets in this case, to achieve (1−1/e)-competitiveness
in an asymptotic small bids regime. Although its budget constraints are not directly captured
by our model, we show that in this asymptotic regime, the Adwords problem corresponds to a
version of our problem where each item has a single price (despite each bidder having multiple
bid values—we explain the reduction in Section 6).
Our main contribution, motivated by the parallel flights problem, is extending all of the preceding
results to setups where items could have multiple prices, that are known in advance. Note that such
a setup also arises naturally from models where the customers have been classified into “types”,
and there is a “match quality” score between each item and each type—in that case, the price set
of an item consists of the item’s possible match scores.
However, allowing for multiple prices per item runs into a known impossibility result: even in the
deterministic case, which corresponds to the aforementioned online weighted matching problem, it
is not possible to provide a non-zero competitive ratio guarantee c which holds for every multi-price
setup (the way c= 1− 1/e was a constant guarantee for every single-price setup). This is because
the moment we commit to a match, unboundedly larger edge weights can arrive afterward—see
Mehta (2013, Ch. 7). Therefore, previous work in online weighted matching has assumed that
matches can be freely disposed if larger weights arrive later (Feldman et al. 2009), or that arrivals
appear in a random order (Kesselheim et al. 2013).
In our paper, we instead assume that the price sets (i.e., the possible edge weights) are known
in advance, and derive weight-dependent competitive ratio guarantees, where our value of c in (1)
will depend on the setup; specifically, the price sets P1, . . . ,Pn of the n items. Our algorithms also
make use of the knowledge of the price sets. Our competitive ratio results are based on establishing
a universal mapping F from price sets P to ratios in [0,1− 1/e], such that:
1. Our Multi-price Balance algorithm, which extends the existing “inventory balancing”
algorithms, is miniF (Pi)-competitive in the asymptotic regime;
52. Our Multi-price Ranking algorithm, which extends the existing “randomized ranking”
algorithm, is miniF (Pi)-competitive in the deterministic case;
3. Any (deterministic or randomized) algorithm can be at most miniF (Pi)-competitive for the
family of setups with price sets chosen from P1, . . . ,Pn, even if we restrict the setups to have
asymptotic starting inventories and/or deterministic arrival sequences.
For any singleton price set P, F (P) = 1− 1/e, and hence if |P1|= . . .= |Pn|= 1, then our results
recover existing results: the (1 − 1/e)-competitiveness of inventory balancing in the asymptotic
regime, the (1−1/e)-competitiveness of randomized ranking in the deterministic case, and a single
counterexample which shows that both of these algorithms are tight. F (P) approaches 0 if P
contains both a large number of prices and large ratios between its prices, so our statement 3 also
recovers the known impossibility result.
1.2. A Bid Price Algorithm when Items have Multiple Prices
We illustrate the necessity for our new algorithms by comparing Multi-price Balance to the
existing inventory balancing algorithm of Golrezaei et al. (2014); similar arguments can be made
in comparisons to the existing online vertex-weighted matching and Adwords algorithms.
Suppose there are parallel flights, whose seats have the same two fare classes: a lower price of
r(L) = 150, and a higher price of r(H) = 450. At any point in time, for each flight i, let wi denote the
fraction its starting inventory which has been sold. The algorithm of Golrezaei et al. (2014) would
associate each fare class j ∈ {L,H} of each flight i with a “pseudorevenue” equal to
r(j) ·Ψ(wi), (2)
where Ψ is a decreasing function that penalizes the revenues associated with flights i which are
almost full. The algorithm then offers, to each customer, the assortment which maximizes the
expected pseudorevenue of the (flight, fare)-combination that the customer would choose.
In (2), although Ψ(wi) will disincentivize the offering of a flight i whose wi is large, the algorithm
has no way of setting a “booking limit”—preventing sales at the lower price r(L) while still allowing
6Figure 1 The Φ function for an item with feasible price set {150,450}.
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sales at price r(H). Given a stream of customers who are only interested in the lower price, the
algorithm would sell all the seats at price r(L), without realizing the opportunity cost of r(H) it gave
up. Since this could happen to every flight i, the algorithm’s competitiveness is at most r
(L)
r(H)
.
To improve upon this, our algorithm must implement some notion of “booking limits”. As a
result, we define the pseudorevenue associated with fare class j of flight i to be
r(j)−Φ(wi), (3)
where Φ is an increasing function that sets a cost to selling flights i which are almost full. Multi-
price Balance uses the same idea of maximizing expected pseudorevenue, with the modification
that it rejects the customer outright if the maximum expected pseudorevenue is non-positive.
The exact form of function Φ for this example is shown in Figure 1. Note that for a flight i, if the
fraction sold wi is between α and 1, then the pseudorevenue (3) will be negative for the lower price
of 150 and positive for the higher price 450, producing a desirable “booking limit” at wi = α. Other
than that, Φ still produces a continuously-increasing cost as wi increases from 0 to 1, allowing us
to trade off between offering the different flights i based on their values of wi.
In (3), Φ(wi) can be interpreted as a bid price, or the value placed on one unit of item i’s
inventory. Optimizing based on bid prices is a classical idea in revenue management (see Talluri
and Van Ryzin (2006), Liu and Van Ryzin (2008)), where typically the bid prices are computed
using a large LP which encompasses both the inventories and the forecasted distribution of future
customers. However, since we make no assumptions about future customers, our bid prices are
based on only the remaining inventories, like the balance algorithms from competitive analysis.
71.3. Our Competitive Ratio Guarantees
In general, for any price set P we define a construction ΦP which we call a value function. In
a setup, if P1, . . . ,Pn denotes the price sets of the items, then Multi-price Balance defines
the pseudorevenues of each item i using value function ΦPi in expression (3). Our Multi-price
Ranking algorithm uses the same value functions, but applies them to a “random seed” instead.
Note that for each item i, the construction of ΦPi from Pi is universal in that it does not depend
on other parameters in the setup, e.g. the price sets of the other items. Our mapping F from
price sets to ratios was also universal. The fact that separately determining the value function ΦPi
for each item i leads to the best-possible competitive ratio of miniF (Pi) is, in our opinion, very
surprising—see also the discussions in Devanur and Jain (2012), Devanur et al. (2013). For any
P, our exact derivation of ΦP and F (P) comes from the solution of a differential equation, which
arises from a primal-dual analysis based on Buchbinder et al. (2007).
When |P| = 1, with P = {r}, value function ΦP(w) = r(1 − Ψ(w)), and hence our notion of
pseudorevenue in (3) coincides with the existing notion in (2). If each item has a single price, then
our algorithms will coincide with the existing ones.
We now give a flavor of our new results with |P|= 2. Let P = {r, ξr}, where ξ > 1 is the ratio
from high price to low price. The value function ΦP depends on ξ (see Figure 1 for an example
with ξ = 450
150
= 3). For any ξ, F (P) equals
1−
√
1 + 4ξ(ξ− 1)/e− 1
2(ξ− 1) =: F (ξ), (4)
and the booking limit implied by ΦP (i.e. the corresponding value of α in Figure 1) equals ln( 11−F (ξ)).
We note that this is different from the booking limit of ξ
2ξ−1 derived by Ball and Queyranne (2009),
which is optimal for selling a single item whose price set is {r, ξr}. For any value of ξ, the booking
limit implied by our function Φ{r,ξr} is greater than
ξ
2ξ−1 , which means that our algorithm is willing
to sell a greater fraction of units at the lower price. The intuitive explanation of this is that with
multiple items, there is less upside to reserving inventory for higher prices, because the reserved
units still have to compete with other items to be sold.
8Figure 2 Competitive ratios guarantees when each item has two prices. The guarantees increase
from bottom to top (as the maximum ratio of an item’s high to low price, ξmax, ranges from ∞ to
1), and from left to right (as the minimum starting inventory, kmin, ranges from 1 to ∞).
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in this diagram is also implied by the results of Chen et al. (2016).
If every item has two prices and ξmax denotes the maximum ratio of an item’s high price to
low price, then miniF (Pi) equals F (ξmax) because F is decreasing. Also letting kmin denote the
minimum starting inventory among the items, we plot, in Figure 2, our competitive ratio guarantees
for Multi-price Balance and Multi-price Ranking as both ξmax and kmin range over [1,∞].
This guarantee equals F (ξmax) in the asymptotic regime or deterministic case, which is tight.
The lower bound on the competitive ratio guarantee when each item has at most two prices
occurs as ξmax→∞, in which case F (ξmax) = 1− 1√e ≈ 0.393. This is greater than the naive bound
of 1
2
(1− 1
e
), which would arise from randomly choosing between 2 prices and then using a (1− 1
e
)-
competitive algorithm on the chosen prices. Thus, using a function like Φ to integrate the selection
of prices with the allocation across items is necessary for achieving the optimal competitive ratio.
Our guarantees may not be tight in the non-asymptotic, non-deterministic setting, which is an
important open problem even in the single-price case (Devanur et al. 2013). Nonetheless, as kmin
increases, our bounds sharply approach the tight guarantee from the asymptotic regime. In the
9single-price case, our bound is a factor of (1+kmin)(1−e−1/kmin) from the tight guarantee of 1−1/e,
improving the previous-best-known dependence on kmin from Golrezaei et al. (2014).
1.4. Simulations on Hotel Data Set of Bodea et al. (2009)
We first summarize the general benefits of applying the algorithms from competitive analysis. In
contrast to traditional algorithms, which optimize based on a forecast of future demand, or attempt
to learn the demand, competitive algorithms guarantee some performance ratio under the worst
case, and operate without any demand information. Most immediately, they are useful for products
with highly unpredictable demand (Ball and Queyranne 2009, Lan et al. 2008), or for initializing
new products with no historical sales data (Van Ryzin and McGill 2000). Second, by eschewing
stochastic processes for generating demand, competitive algorithms are usually simple and flexible,
leading to clean insights about the problem (Borodin and El-Yaniv 2005). Third, past research has
reported on cases where competitive algorithms perform well in practice (Feldman et al. 2010), or
on average in numerical experiments (Golrezaei et al. 2014, Chen et al. 2016).
In Section 7, we run simulations on the publicly-accessible hotel data set of Bodea et al. (2009).
We use the product availability information to estimate customer choice models, and use the
sequence of transactions as the sequence of arrivals. This leads to an online assortment problem
like in Golrezaei et al. (2014), but with multiple prices (advance-purchase rate, rack rate, etc.) for
each item (King room, Two-double room, etc.). We compare the performance of our Multi-price
Balance algorithm to various benchmarks and forecasting algorithms.
The main conclusion from our simulations is that the best performance is achieved by hybrid
algorithms (see Golrezaei et al. (2014)). These are forecasting-based algorithms which continuously
reference our forecast-independent value functions Φ1, . . . ,Φn, and adjust their decisions accord-
ingly. Although this only changes a small fraction (≈ 5%) of decisions, these tend to be the decisions
where the forecast is being most overconfident. Therefore, not only does this boost average perfor-
mance, it drastically reduces the variance in performance caused when the forecast is wrong.
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1.5. Other Related Work
We briefly mention some papers which study online resource allocation problems under other arrival
models or performance metrics.
When a stochastic process generating the arrivals is given as input, the resulting optimization
problem is generally still computationally intractable. Nonetheless, many effective heuristics have
been proposed under various models of online resource allocation (Zhang and Cooper 2005, Jasin
and Kumar 2012, Ciocan and Farias 2012, Chen and Farias 2013). These heuristics can earn 1
2
of
the LP optimum in general settings (Chan and Farias 2009, Wang et al. 2015). Manshadi et al.
(2012) derive an improved performance ratio when the stochastic process is IID.
Competitive/approximation ratios both analyze the fraction of optimum achieved by an algo-
rithm, but online resource allocation problems are also often analyzed under the regret metric,
which measures the difference from optimum. This work often focuses on learning some unknown
underlying stochastic model (Badanidiyuru et al. 2013, Ferreira et al. 2016). On the other hand,
queueing-theoretic analyses have also been performed given a known stochastic model (Reiman
and Wang 2008). Unlike in competitive analysis, all of these papers tend to focus on asymptotic
performance as the number of customers grows to infinity. Finally, a recent metric which has been
introduced is regret ratio (Zhang et al. 2016). For a comprehensive review of different metrics under
different models of demand (for a single item), we refer to Araman and Caldentey (2011).
1.6. Organization of Paper
Throughout Sections 2–5 of this paper, we analyze a simplified model where each customer is
offered a single item at a single price (but her purchase decision is still stochastic). This avoids the
complexities of assortment optimization while still capturing our main techniques. In Section 6, we
discuss the generalizations to the assortment and Adwords settings. In Section 7, we display the
results of our simulations on the hotel data set.
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2. Problem Definition, Algorithm Sketch, and Theorem Statements
A firm is selling n ∈ N different items. Each item i ∈ [n]1 starts with a fixed inventory of ki ∈ N
units, and could be offered at any price in its price set Pi. Throughout most of this paper, we
assume that each Pi consists of mi ∈N discrete prices satisfying 0< r(1)i < . . . < r(mi)i . We will refer
to r
(j)
i as “price j of item i”, and define r
(0)
i := 0. We extend to the case where Pi is a continuum
of prices in Appendix E.1.
There are T ∈N customers arriving sequentially. Upon the arrival of customer t∈ [T ], the firm is
given p
(j)
t,i , the probability
2 that customer t would buy item i at price j, for all i∈ [n] and j ∈ [mi].3
The firm chooses up to one of the items i with remaining inventory and offers it to customer t,
at any price j ∈ [mi]. The customer accepts the offer with probability p(j)t,i , in which case the firm
earns revenue r
(j)
i , and the inventory of item i is decremented by 1.
We divide the elements defined above into:
1. The Setup S, consisting of parameters known at the start: (n, (ki,mi, r(1)i , . . . , r(mi)i )i∈[n]); and
2. The Arrival sequence A, consisting of parameters revealed over time: (T, (p(j)t,i )t∈[T ],i∈[n],j∈[mi]).
An online algorithm must decide, on any setup S, what to offer to each customer t. This deci-
sion can be based on only the setup S, the past arrivals/purchase realizations, and the purchase
probabilities p
(j)
t,i of the present customer t; the online algorithm does not know the purchase proba-
bilities associated with future customers. For an online algorithm, let ALG(S,A) denote the revenue
earned on a run on setup S with arrival sequence A, which is a random variable with respect to
the customers’ purchase decisions as well, as any randomness in the algorithm’s decisions.
Meanwhile, we can write the following LP for setup S with arrival sequence A:
max
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
mi∑
j=1
p
(j)
t,i r
(j)
i x
(j)
t,i (5a)
1 For a general positive integer b, let [b] denote the set {1, . . . , b}.
2 If Pi is a continuum of prices, then we need to assume that the purchase probabilities can be input compactly.
There are many parametric models for doing so, e.g. linear demand, where the purchase probability is a− bP for
prices P lying in an interval [rmin, rmax].
3 These probabilities can be 0 for items the customer is not interested in, or prices that are too high.
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T∑
t=1
mi∑
j=1
p
(j)
t,i x
(j)
t,i ≤ ki i∈ [n] (5b)
n∑
i=1
mi∑
j=1
x
(j)
t,i ≤ 1 t∈ [T ] (5c)
x
(j)
t,i ≥ 0 t∈ [T ], i∈ [n], j ∈ [mi] (5d)
LP (5) encapsulates the execution of any algorithm, which could make full use of the arrival
sequence A at the start, on setup S—x(j)t,i represents the unconditional probability of the algorithm
offering item i at price j to customer t; (5b) enforces that starting inventories are respected; (5c)
enforces that at most one combination of item and price is offered to each customer; and objective
function (5a) represents the expected revenue earned by the algorithm. Let OPT(S,A) denote its
optimal objective value. Note that although OPT(S,A) knows the arrival sequence in advance, it
does not know the outcomes of the customers’ potential purchase decisions.
For a fixed online algorithm and any setup S, the online algorithm is said to achieve a competitive
ratio of c on S, if
E[ALG(S,A)]
OPT(S,A) ≥ c for all arrival sequences A. (6)
In this paper, we will allow the competitive ratio guarantee c to depend on parameters in the setup
S, and derive results that hold for any S.
Definition (6) provides a guarantee on E[ALG(S,A)] relative to any algorithm which could have
been possible, due to the following standard result.
Lemma 1. OPT(S,A) is an upper bound on the expected revenue of any algorithm, which could
make full use of the arrival information at the start, on setup S with arrival sequence A.
The proof of Lemma 1 is deferred to Appendix A. The definition of OPT(S,A) based on the
LP is standard in problems with both stochastic purchase realizations and arbitrary customer
arrivals—we refer to Mehta and Panigrahi (2012), Golrezaei et al. (2014) for its justification.
In the deterministic case of our problem, every p
(j)
t,i is 0 or 1. The problem can be simplified by
letting jt,i = max{j ∈ [mi] : p(j)t,i = 1}, with jt,i = 0 if the set is empty, for all t ∈ [T ] and i ∈ [n]. We
13
say that item i is assigned to customer t to indicate that i is offered to customer t at price jt,i,
which results in a sale; there is no reason to offer any other price. Customer t can also be rejected,
e.g. if jt,i is low for every i. In the deterministic case, the LP (5) is integral, so OPT(S,A) is equal
to the revenue of the best algorithm knowing the arrival sequence at the start.
2.1. Construction of Value Function for a Price Set
In this section, we specify a value function ΦP and a number F (P), for any price set P consisting
of m discrete prices with 0< r(1) < . . . < r(m). The derivation of ΦP and F (P), as well as the case
where P is a continuum of prices, are deferred to Appendix E.
Consider an item with price set P. Following the description from Section 1.2, we will interpret
ΦP to be a function of w ∈ [0,1], which is the fraction of the item’s starting inventory which has
been sold. ΦP(w) specifies the value that should be placed on one unit of the item’s inventory,
when its fraction sold is w.
First we define “booking limits” α(1), . . . , α(m), which are the fractions of starting inventory
“reserved” for the respective fares r(1), . . . , r(m), via the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let r(1), . . . , r(m) be any numbers satisfying 0< r(1) < . . . < r(m). Then there is a
unique set of positive values α(1), . . . , α(m) which sum to 1 and satisfy
1− e−α(1) = 1
1− r(1)/r(2) · (1− e
−α(2)) = . . .=
1
1− r(m−1)/r(m) · (1− e
−α(m)). (7)
There is also a different, unique set of positive values σ(1), . . . , σ(m) which sum to 1 and satisfy
σ(1) =
1
1− r(1)/r(2) ·σ
(2) = . . .=
1
1− r(m−1)/r(m) ·σ
(m). (8)
The proof of Proposition 1 is elementary and deferred to Appendix A. While finding the exact
solution to (7) requires finding the roots of a degree-m polynomial, a numerical solution can easily
be found via bisection search.
Proposition 1 contrasts α(1), . . . , α(m) in (7) with the booking limits σ(1), . . . , σ(m) in (8) originally
derived by Ball and Queyranne (2009), which are optimal for selling a single item with price set
{r(1), . . . , r(m)}. With α(1), . . . , α(m), we can now complete the definition of ΦP .
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Definition 1. Define the following, based on the values of α(1), . . . , α(m) from Proposition 1:
• L(j): the sum ∑jj′=1α(j′), defined for all j = 0, . . . ,m (note that L(0) = 0 and L(m) = 1);
• `(·): a function on [0,1], where `(w) is the unique j ∈ [m] for which w ∈ [L(j−1),L(j)) (note
that `(L(j)) = j+ 1 for j = 0, . . . ,m− 1; we define `(L(m)) to be m).
The value function ΦP for price set P is then defined over w ∈ [0,1] by:
ΦP(w) = r
(`(w)−1) + (r(`(w))− r(`(w)−1))exp(w−L
(`(w)−1))− 1
exp(α(`(w)))− 1 . (9)
An example of ΦP for P = {150,450} was plotted in the Introduction, in Figure 1. In general, ΦP
is continuously increasing and piecewise-convex over m segments of lengths α(1), . . . , α(m), separated
by segment borders L(0), . . . ,L(m). For each j, Φ reaches the value of r(j) at L(j).
Definition 2. For price set P = {r(1), . . . , r(m)}, let F (P) = 1−e−α(1) and G(P) = σ(1), where α(1)
and σ(1) are the values from Proposition 1.
Our competitive ratio guarantees will be based on the functions F and G. It can be checked that
F maps a price set P to [1− e−1/m,1− e−1] and G maps the price set to [1/m,1], where m is the
number of prices in P. When m= 1, our value function is ΦP(w) = r(1) · ew−1e−1 , which can be related
back to the existing multiplicative “penalty functions” from the single-price case.
2.2. Sketch of our MULTI-PRICE BALANCE and MULTI-PRICE RANKING Algorithms
Having defined the value function ΦP for an arbitrary price set P, we now sketch our algorithms.
We start with Multi-price Ranking, which is simpler. It assumes that ki = 1 for all i, which
does not lose generality since an item that starts with multiple units of inventory can be transformed
into multiple disparate items. At the start, the algorithm fixes for each item i a random seed Wi,
drawn independently and uniformly from [0,1]. It then treats ΦPi(Wi) as the bid price for the
single unit of item i: it offers to each customer t the available item i and price j maximizing the
expected pseudorevenue, p
(j)
t,i
(
r
(j)
i −ΦPi(Wi)
)
.
Multi-price Ranking hedges against the ambiguity in customer arrivals using randomness,
which is standard in competitive analysis. The random seed Wi determines the random minimum
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price at which the algorithm is willing to sell item i, as well as a random priority for selling i when
the algorithm is choosing between multiple items.
We now sketch Multi-price Balance, which updates the bid price of each item i based on the
fraction wi of its ki units which has been sold. However, the algorithm does not directly use ΦPi(wi)
as the bid price of item i, because wi would always be a multiple of
1
ki
, while the booking limits
and segment borders which ΦPi is based on may not be multiples of
1
ki
. Instead, the algorithm first
uses a randomized procedure for rounding the booking limits in ΦPi to multiples of
1
ki
.
Specifically, at the start, the algorithm fixes for each item i random segment borders
L˜
(0)
i , . . . , L˜
(mi)
i , which are multiples of
1
ki
satisfying 0 = L˜
(0)
i ≤ . . .≤ L˜(mi)i = 1. We note that having
L˜(i) = L˜(i−1) is possible (and guaranteed to happen if mi >ki), in which case the i’th segment has
length zero. In either case, the realizations of L˜
(0)
i , . . . , L˜
(mi)
i imply a random value function Φ˜i for
item i, which is a perturbation of ΦPi . Function Φ˜i is defined on {0, 1ki , . . . ,1}, since the fraction
sold wi is always a multiple of
1
ki
, and also satisfies 0 = Φ˜i(0)≤ Φ˜i( 1ki )≤ . . .≤ Φ˜i(1). At any point
in time, Multi-price Balance treats Φ˜i(wi) as the bid price for item i: it offers to each customer
t the item i and price j maximizing
p
(j)
t,i
(
Φ˜i(L˜
(j)
i )− Φ˜i(wi)
)
. (10)
In (10), the definition of pseudorevenue at price j is Φ˜i(L˜
(j)
i )− Φ˜i(wi) instead of r(j)i − Φ˜i(wi). This
is because we want the expected pseudorevenue to be 0 when wi = L˜
(j)
i . In general, the realized Φ˜i
will be close to ΦPi , so that Φ˜i(L˜
(j)
i )≈ΦPi(L(j)i ) = r(j)i . In the asymptotic regime with ki→∞, Φ˜i
is deterministically initialized to ΦPi . However, for small ki, optimizing a randomized procedure for
initializing Φ˜i (based on r
(1)
i , . . . , r
(mi)
i as well as ki) instead of having the deterministic ΦPi (which
is based on only r
(1)
i , . . . , r
(mi)
i ) allows us to achieve a greater competitive ratio.
2.3. Statements of Our Results
Our competitive ratio results are based on the universal functions F and G from Definition 2,
which assign a number to every price set P.
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Theorem 1. For any setup, with price sets denoted by P1, . . . ,Pn and starting inventories denoted
by k1, . . . , kn, Multi-price Balance achieves a competitive ratio of mini F˜i, where for each item
i, F˜i is lower-bounded by all of: (i)
F (Pi)
(1+ki)(e
1/ki−1) ; (ii)
G(Pi)
2
; and (iii) 1−1/e
(1+ki)(1−e−1/ki )
if |Pi|= 1.
Corollary 1. Multi-price Balance achieves a competitive ratio approaching miniF (Pi) as
each starting inventory ki approaches ∞.
Corollary 2. Suppose that each item has at most m discrete prices and at least k units of starting
inventory. Then the competitive ratio achieved by Multi-price Balance is lower-bounded by
1−e−1/m
(1+k)(e1/k−1) , which approaches 1− e−1/m as k approaches ∞.
Theorem 1 is our general result, where for each i, F˜i is determined by the randomized procedure
used to initialize the value function Φ˜i for item i.
Lower bound (i) on F˜i is attained by a randomized procedure which perturbs the “ideal” value
function ΦPi to define Φ˜i. This perturbation loses a factor of (1+ki)(e
1/ki−1) in the denominator,
which decreases to 1 as ki→∞, resulting in Corollary 1. Corollary 2 is a further simplification
of the bound presented, using the fact that F (P) ≥ 1 − e−1/|P|. Meanwhile, lower bound (ii) is
attained by solving an optimization problem for the best randomized procedure to define Φ˜i when
ki = 1; this procedure is not based on perturbing ΦPi and the bound is based on G(Pi) instead of
F (Pi). Finally, lower bound (iii) is an improvement of (i) in the single-price case, where we have
gained a factor of e1/ki in the denominator. It simplifies and improves the dependence on ki from
Golrezaei et al. (2014).
Multi-price Balance is formalized and Theorem 1 is proven in Section 3. We explain the
ideas behind our primal-dual analysis, why we need random value functions, and how to overcome
the ensuing analytical challenges.
Theorem 2. For any setup in the deterministic case, Multi-price Ranking achieves a compet-
itive ratio of miniF (Pi).
Multi-price Ranking is formalized and Theorem 2 is proven in Section 4. Our analysis builds
upon the framework of Devanur et al. (2013) and extends it to handle multiple prices.
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Theorem 3. Let k be any positive integer. Let P be any price set consisting of m prices with
0 < r(1) < . . . < r(m). Then there exists a setup S where each item has starting inventory k and
price set P, along with a distribution over arrival sequences A falling in the deterministic case, for
which no online algorithm can have expected revenue greater than F (P) ·EA[OPT(S,A)].
Theorem 3 is proven in Section 5. Since the starting inventory k can be made arbitrarily large
and the arrival sequences fall in the deterministic case, Theorem 3 implies that the competitive
ratio guarantees in Corollary 1 and Theorem 2 are tight, via Yao’s minimax principle (Yao 1977).
Our counterexample is based on those from Karp et al. (1990), Mehta et al. (2007), Golrezaei
et al. (2014), where a large number of customers arrive according to a random permutation chosen
uniformly from all possible permutations. In our case however, the customers are further split into
m “phases”, where the customers in phase j are willing to pay r(j) for any of the items they are
interested in. The phases lengths are optimized by an adversary to minimize the competitive ratio.
Interestingly, on the existing counterexamples, the random permutation implies that all (reason-
able) algorithms are indifferent and have the same performance. By contrast, on our counterexam-
ple with the adversarially-optimized phase lengths, there is a unique optimal algorithm given the
distribution over arrival sequences A. When k→∞, this unique algorithms turns out to be our
Multi-price Balance and Multi-price Ranking algorithms, which coalesce to the same algo-
rithm in the asymptotic regime. This coalescence phenomenon has been noted in the single-price
case as well by Aggarwal et al. (2011).
Proposition 2. For m ≥ 2 prices satisfying 0 < r(1) < . . . < r(m), from which α(1) and σ(1) are
defined according to Proposition 1, the following inequalities hold:
(1− 1
e
) ·σ(1) < 1− e−σ(1) < 1− e−α(1) ; (11)
1
1 + ln r
(m)
r(1)
<σ(1); (12)
1− e−α < 1− e−α(1) , where α is the unique solution to 1− e−α = 1−α
ln r
(m)
r(1)
. (13)
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Finally, Proposition 2, which is proven in Appendix A, puts our tight competitive ratio of 1−
e−α
(1)
into perspective. σ(1) is the existing tight competitive ratio for a single item, while 1− 1
e
is the existing tight competitive ratio for multiple items with one price each. (11) shows that
our competitive ratio for multiple items with multiple prices is not a naive combination of the
existing competitive ratios; our algorithms also cannot be obtained by naively combining existing
algorithms.
With a single item whose price can take any value in the continuum [r(1), r(m)], the tight com-
petitive ratio is 1
1+ln(r(m)/r(1))
(Ball and Queyranne 2009). (12) says that if the prices are restricted
to a discrete subset of [r(1), r(m)], then the competitive ratio of σ(1) can only be larger.
We have a corresponding relationship in the multi-price setting. 1− e−α, with α as defined4 in
(13), is our competitive ratio when there are multiple items whose price sets are [r(1), r(m)]. (13)
says that if the prices are restricted to a discrete subset of [r(1), r(m)], then the competitive ratio
of 1− e−α(1) can only be larger.
3. MULTI-PRICE BALANCE and the Proof of Theorem 1
Multi-price Balance, as sketched in Subsection 2.2, is formalized in Algorithm 1. For now, we
consider a generic randomized procedure for initializing L˜
(0)
i , . . . , L˜
(mi)
i and Φ˜i in Step 1, where the
realized initializations always satisfy the following monotonicity conditions:
L˜
(0)
i , . . . , L˜
(mi)
i ∈ {0,
1
ki
, . . . ,1}, 0 = L˜(0)i ≤ . . .≤ L˜(mi)i = 1; (14)
Φ˜i(0), Φ˜i(
1
ki
), . . . , Φ˜i(1)∈R, 0 = Φ˜i(0)≤ Φ˜i( 1
ki
)≤ . . .≤ Φ˜i(1). (15)
Since Φ˜i is non-decreasing, the expression Φ˜i(L˜
(j)
i )− Φ˜i(Niki ) in (16) is non-positive once the number
sold Ni reaches ki. Therefore, Algorithm 1 never tries to offer an item i which has stocked out.
4 α can be solved to equal 1 − W (ReR−1)/R, where W is the inverse of the function f(x) = xex, and R =
ln(r(m)/r(1))—see Appendix E.1.
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Algorithm 1 Multi-price Balance
1: Initialize L˜
(0)
i , . . . , L˜
(mi)
i , Φ˜i randomly and independently for each i∈ [n]
2: Ni← 0 for all i∈ [n] (Ni tracks the total number of copies of item i sold, at any price)
3: for t= 1,2, . . . do
4: Compute
max
i∈[n],j∈[mi]
p
(j)
t,i (Φ˜i(L˜
(j)
i )− Φ˜i(
Ni
ki
)) (16)
5: if the value of (16) is strictly positive then
6: Offer any item i∗t and price j
∗
t maximizing (16) to customer t
7: if customer t accepts (occurring with probability p
(j∗t )
t,i∗t
) then
8: Zt← Φ˜i∗t (L˜
(j∗t )
i∗t
)− Φ˜i∗t (Ni∗t /ki∗t ) (this is the pseudorevenue earned)
9: Ni∗t ←Ni∗t + 1
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
Theorem 4. Suppose in Line 1 of Algorithm 1, for each i∈ [n], the segment borders L˜(1)i , . . . , L˜(mi)i
and value function Φ˜i are randomly initialized in a way such that
ki(Φ˜i(
N + 1
ki
)− Φ˜i(N
ki
)) + Φ˜i(L˜
(j)
i )− Φ˜i(
N
ki
)≤ r
(j)
i
c
, j ∈ [mi],N ∈ {0, . . . , L˜(j)i ki− 1}; (17)
E[Φ˜i(L˜(j)i )]≥ r(j)i , j ∈ [mi]. (18)
Then Algorithm 1 achieves a competitive ratio of c.
Theorem 4 identifies conditions which, when satisfied by the randomized procedure for each i,
yields a competitive ratio of c. Note that (17) needs to hold for every potential initialization of
Φ˜i, while (18) only needs to hold in expectation over the initializations. We prove Theorem 4 in
Appendix B, but outline its proof here and provide some intuition.
First, we take the dual of the LP (5):
min
n∑
i=1
kiyi +
T∑
t=1
zt (19a)
p
(j)
t,i yi + zt ≥ p(j)t,i r(j)i t∈ [T ], i∈ [n], j ∈ [mi] (19b)
yi, zt ≥ 0 i∈ [n], t∈ [T ] (19c)
By weak duality, OPT(S,A) is upper-bounded by the objective value of any feasible dual solution.
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During the (random) execution of Algorithm 1, it maintains a dual variable yi = Φ˜i(
Ni
ki
) for each
i. At each time t, only if a sale is realized, does the algorithm set zt to a non-zero value Zt (Line 8)
and increment the yi-variables by incrementing Ni∗t (Line 9). We prove three claims:
1. During each time t ∈ [T ], the gain in the dual objective is at most some multiple 1
c
of the
revenue earned by the algorithm;
2. During each time t∈ [T ], the conditional expectation of Zt over the random purchase decision
of customer t, combined with the current value of yi, make the LHS of (19b) at least p
(j)
t,i ·
Φ˜i(L˜
(j)
i ), for all i∈ [n] and j ∈ [mi];
3. The expectation of Φ˜i(L˜
(j)
i ), over the random segment borders and value function initially
chosen by the algorithm, is at least r
(j)
i , for all i∈ [n] and j ∈ [mi].
Claim 1 follows from condition (17), while Claim 3 follows from condition (18). Claims 2 and 3 can
be combined to show that the dual variables yi and zt maintained by the algorithm are feasible,
after taking an expectation over all sample paths.
We explain the intuition behind our idea of a random value function, and the resulting analysis.
Even for a single item, with a small starting inventory and a large ratio r from its highest to
lowest price, in order to achieve a constant competitive ratio which does not scale with r, one
must use random booking limits (Ball and Queyranne 2009). With multiple items, our equivalent
is to have the configuration of segment borders L˜
(0)
i , . . . , L˜
(mi)
i be random, and define an arbitrary
value function Φ˜i corresponding to each one. In order to “average” over these configurations in the
analysis, we relax dual feasibility to only hold in expectation. The idea of feasibility in expectation
has been previously seen, but in different contexts: in Devanur et al. (2013), over a random seed,
and in Golrezaei et al. (2014), over a random purchase decision (similar to our Claim 2).
3.1. Optimizing the Randomized Procedures
Theorem 4 reduces the problem of deriving a competitive algorithm to that of finding a randomized
procedure for initializing Φ˜1, . . . , Φ˜n satisfying (17)–(18). We can consider this problem separately
for each i, based on r
(1)
i , . . . , r
(mi)
i and ki, and omit the subscript i.
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A randomized procedure consists of a distribution over the all of the configurations satisfying
(14), and for each configuration, values for Φ˜( 1
k
), Φ˜( 2
k
), . . . , Φ˜(1) satisfying (15). We would like
to find a randomized procedure which satisfies (17)–(18) with a maximal value of c. While this
optimization problem is intractable in general, we can use the intuition behind the definitions of
L(0), . . . ,L(m) and ΦP from Subsection 2.1 to specify a near-optimal randomized procedure.
Definition 3. Define the following randomized procedure for initializing Φ˜:
1. Draw a random seed W uniformly from [0,1];
2. For each j, set L˜(j) = bL
(j)kc+1
k
if W <L(j)k−bL(j)kc, and L˜(j) = bL(j)kc
k
otherwise;
3. For q ∈ {0, 1
k
, . . . ,1}, let ˜`(q) be the unique j ∈ [m] such that L˜(j−1) ≤ q < L˜(j) (note that
˜`(L˜(j)) = j+ 1 for j = 0, . . . ,m− 1; we define ˜`(L˜(m)) to be m).
The value function Φ˜ is then defined over q ∈ {0, 1
k
, . . . ,1} by
Φ˜(q) =
˜`(q)−1∑
j=1
(r(j)− r(j−1))exp(L˜
(j)− L˜(j−1))− 1
exp(α(j))− 1 + (r
(˜`(q))− r(˜`(q)−1))exp(q− L˜
(˜`(q)−1))− 1
exp(α(˜`(q)))− 1 . (20)
Φ˜ increases over the m (possibly empty) “segments” of its domain {0, 1
k
, . . . ,1}, which are “bor-
dered” by L˜(0), . . . , L˜(m). (20) is similar to definition (9) for ΦP , except the sum in (20) does not
telescope, since L˜(j)− L˜(j−1) equals α(j) only in expectation.
Note that in Step 2 above, the random segment borders L˜(0), . . . , L˜(m) are rounded comonotoni-
cally (in a perfectly positively correlated fashion) using a single seed. This ensures that the borders
are increasing as required in (14), as well as the following properties.
Proposition 3. The random values of L˜(0), . . . , L˜(m) from Definition 3 satisfy:
E[L˜(j)] =L(j), j = 0, . . . ,m; (21)
|(L˜(j)− L˜(j′))− (L(j)−L(j′))| ≤ 1
k
, 1≤ j′ < j ≤m. (22)
(22) is the key property derived from comonotonicity: although the rounding could move each
L˜(j) by up to 1/k in either direction, the distance between two different L˜(j), L˜(j
′) never changes
by more than 1/k from L(j)−L(j′). Proposition 3 is then used to prove our main result about the
randomized procedure from Definition 3.
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Algorithm 2 Multi-price Ranking in the Deterministic Case
1: Initialize Wi uniformly at random from [0,1], independently for each i∈ [n]
2: availablei← true for all i∈ [n]
3: for t= 1,2, . . . do
4: Compute
max
i∈[n],j∈[mi]:availablei=true
(r
(jt,i)
i −ΦPi(Wi)) (23)
5: if the value of (23) is strictly positive then
6: Offer any item i∗t maximizing (23) to customer t, at price jt,i∗t
7: availablei∗t ← false
8: end if
9: end for
Theorem 5. The randomized procedure for initializing Φ˜ from Definition 3 satisfies (17)–(18)
with c= 1−e
−α(1)
(1+k)(e1/k−1) . Furthermore, if m= 1, then the value of c can be improved to
1−e−α(1)
(1+k)(1−e−1/k) .
Theorem 5 is proven in Appendix B. It, in conjunction with Theorem 4, establishes bounds (i)
and (iii) from our main result for Multi-price Balance, Theorem 1. In Appendix B, we state
the complete proof of Theorem 1, including bound (ii), which involves explicitly formulating the
optimization problem over randomized procedures and solving it when k= 1.
4. MULTI-PRICE RANKING and the Proof of Theorem 2
In Subsection 2.2, we sketched Multi-price Ranking for our general problem. In Algorithm 2,
we formalize it specifically for the deterministic case, which is the case analyzed in Theorem 2.
Note that we have assumed, without loss of generality, that ki = 1 for each item i.
Our analysis extends the framework of Devanur et al. (2013) to incorporate multiple prices. It
uses the dual LP defined in (19), where every p
(j)
t,i is 0 or 1.
If Algorithm 2 assigns item i to customer t (charging price jt,i), then we set dual variables
Zt = r
(jt,i)
i −ΦPi(Wi) and Yi = Φ′Pi(Wi), where ΦPi is the fixed function defined in Subsection 2.1
(we ignore the measure-zero set where Φ′Pi is undefined). All dual variables not set during a time
period are defined to be zero. The following lemmas are proven in Appendix C:
Lemma 2. If Algorithm 2 assigns item i to customer t, then (1− e−α(1)i )(Yi +Zt)≤ r(jt,i)i w.p.1.
Lemma 3. Setting yi =E[Yi], zt =E[Zt] for all i, t forms a feasible solution to the dual LP (19).
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The proof of Theorem 2 is then easy given these lemmas:
Proof of Theorem 2. Lemma 3 implies OPT(S,A)≤∑ni=1E[Yi] +∑Tt=1E[Zt], via weak duality.
However, by Lemma 2, the revenue earned by Algorithm 2 is at least mini∈[n]{1−e−α
(1)
i }·(∑ni=1 Yi+∑T
t=1Zt
)
, with probability 1. Thus, E[ALG(S,A)]≥ (1− exp(−mini∈[n]α(1)i )) ·OPT(S,A). 
5. Randomized Counterexample and the Proof of Theorem 3
We first formalize the setup and randomized arrival sequence described in Subsection 2.3.
There are n ∈N items, indexed by i, which all have mi =m, r(j)i = r(j) for all j, and ki = k for
some k ∈N. We think of n as going to ∞, while k is arbitrary. Throughout this example, we often
express quantities as portions τ of n. We abuse notation and write τn to refer to an integer, even
if τ is irrational, since the error from rounding τn to the nearest integer is negligible as n→∞.
The arrival sequence is randomized following the classical construction of Karp et al. (1990).
There are T = nk customers, split into n “groups” of k identical customers each. Uniformly draw
a random permutation pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) of (1, . . . , n) from the n! possibilities. For i ∈ [n], all k
customers in group i would deterministically buy any item in {pii, . . . , pin}. Our construction differs
from existing ones in that the n groups of customers are further split into m “phases”. Let β1, . . . , βm
be positive numbers summing to 1, corresponding to the fraction of groups in each phase, whose
values we specify later. For all j ∈ [m], the customers in groups (β1 + . . .+ βj−1)n+ 1, . . . , (β1 +
. . .+βj)n are willing to pay r
(j) for any of the items in their interest set.
Definition 4. Define the following shorthand notation for all j = 1, . . . ,m+ 1:
• Aj :=
∑m
`=j α
(`) (note that A1 = 1 and Am+1 = 0);
• Bj :=
∑m
`=j β` (note that B1 = 1 and Bm+1 = 0).
Proposition 4. Given m∈N, 0< r(1) < . . . < r(m), and α(1), . . . , α(m) as defined in Proposition 1,
there exists a unique solution to the following system of equations in variables B2, . . . ,Bm:
Bmr
(m)e−α
(m)
= . . .=B2r
(2)e−α
(2)
= r(1)e−α
(1)
, (24)
with 0<Bm < . . . <B2 <B1 = 1.
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We define B2, . . . ,Bm according to Proposition 4. This implies definitions for β1, . . . , βm, which
are strictly positive and sum to 1.
Now, regardless of the permutation pi, the optimal algorithm allocates the k copies of item pii
to the customers in group i, for each i∈ [n], successfully serving all T = nk customers and earning
revenue
∑m
j=1 r
(j)(βjn)k. This is also the optimal objective value of the LP (5). Therefore, regardless
of the realized arrival sequence A, OPT(S,A) =∑mj=1 r(j)(βjn)k which we can rewrite as
m∑
j=1
(r(j)− r(j−1))Bjnk. (25)
5.1. Upper Bound on Performance of Online Algorithms
Lemma 4. The expected revenue of an online algorithm with this randomized A is upper-bounded
by the maximum value of
m∑
j=1
r(j)Bjn(1− e−λj )k (26)
subject to 0≤ λj ≤ ln BjBj+1 for j ∈ [m− 1], 0≤ λm, and
∑m
j=1 λj ≤ 1.
Lemma 4 drastically simplifies the analysis of the online algorithm, because it restricts to algo-
rithms which are indifferent to the realized permutation pi, allowing for a deterministic analysis.
However, our analysis differs from existing ones (e.g. (Golrezaei et al. 2014, Lem. 6)) in that despite
the item symmetry, the online algorithm has a decision—how many customers in each phase to
serve, as opposed to reserving inventory for customers in future phases.
This is controlled by the λ-variables, where λj denotes the expected fraction of item pin’s inventory
sold to phase-j customers. The expected number of groups served during phase j is then at most
Bjn(1− e−λj ), resulting in the upper bound (26). Constraint λj ≤ ln BjBj+1 comes from the fact that
Bjn(1− e−λj ) must not exceed the total number of groups in phase j, βjn.
Lemma 5. Let j ∈ [m] and τ ∈ [0,1]. The maximum value of
m∑
`=j
r(`)B`n(1− e−λ`)k (27)
subject to λ` ≥ 0 for all `= j, . . . ,m as well as
∑m
`=j λ` ≤ τ is
nk
m∑
`=j
r(`)B`
(
1− exp (−α(`) + Aj − τ
m− j+ 1
))
. (28)
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Lemma 5 establishes the optimal objective value of the optimization problem from Lemma 4.
The upper bound of ln
Bj
Bj+1
on λj for j ∈ [m− 1] turns out to not be binding. With both lemmas,
the proof of Theorem 3 is easy.
Proof of Theorem 3. The value of (28) with j = 1 and τ = 1 is
nk
m∑
`=1
r(`)B`(1− e−α(`)) = (1− e−α(1))
m∑
`=1
(r(`)− r(`−1))B`nk, (29)
where we have used (7) to derive the equality. Combining Lemmas 4–5, we get that the RHS of (29)
is an upper bound on E[ALG(S,A)], for any online algorithm. Meanwhile, OPT(S,A) is equal to
(25) regardless of A, which is exactly the RHS of (29) divided by (1− e−α(1)). We have established
that E[ALG(S,A)]≤ (1− e−α(1))E[OPTA(S,A)], completing the proof of the theorem. 
Remark 1. Suppose that k→∞. It can be seen that our algorithm (either Multi-price Bal-
ance or Multi-price Ranking, which behave identically when k →∞—see Aggarwal et al.
(2011)), with booking limits α(1), . . . , α(m), is the unique optimal algorithm given this distribution
over arrival sequences. Indeed, the proof of Lemma 4 shows that given λ1, . . . , λm, the dominant
strategy for the online algorithm is to deplete the inventories of items evenly (which is possible since
k→∞), in which case upper bound (26) is attained. The proof of Lemma 5 shows that the unique
optimal values for λ1, . . . , λm are α
(1), . . . , α(m). It only remains to show that λj = α
(j) is feasible,
namely α(j) ≤ ln Bj
Bj+1
for j <m. Applying (24), this is equivalent to showing e−α
(j) ≥ r(j)e−α
(j)
r(j+1)e−α(j+1)
,
or e−α
(j+1) ≥ r(j)
r(j+1)
, which follows from (7) since 1− e−α(1) ≤ 1.
6. Extending our Techniques
We explain how our techniques can be extended to allow for fractional inventory consumption like
in the Adwords problem (Mehta et al. 2007), or offering multiple items like in the online assortment
problem (Golrezaei et al. 2014).
Consider the following modification of our problem from Section 2: when customer t is offered
item i at price j, she deterministically pays p
(j)
t,i r
(j)
i and consumes a fractional amount p
(j)
t,i ≤ 1 of
item i’s inventory, instead of paying r
(j)
i and consuming 1 unit with probability p
(j)
t,i . We assume
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that mini ki →∞. This generalizes the Adwords problem under the small bids assumption, by
allowing each budget i to be depleted at mi different rates r
(1)
i , . . . , r
(mi)
i .
For this problem, we use Multi-price Balance, except since we are taking mini ki→∞, we
can deterministically set each Φ˜i = ΦPi . The three claims used to establish Theorem 4 are simpler:
Claim 2 now holds deterministically instead of requiring a conditional expectation over Zt, while
Claim 3 also holds deterministically since Φ˜i is always ΦPi . In Theorem 5, condition (17) is now
only satisfied under an additional error term ε, since N is no longer a discrete integer. Nonetheless,
the rounding error ε approaches 0 as ki→∞, so the optimal competitive ratio is still achieved.
For online assortment, we use the term product to refer to an (item, price)-combination (i, j).
Consider the following modification of our problem from Section 2: upon the arrival of customer
t, for any subset (assortment) S of products and (i, j) ∈ S, we are given p(j)t,i (S), the probability
that customer t would pick product (i, j) when offered the choice from S. After being given these
probabilities, we must offer an assortment S to customer t. This generalizes the original online
assortment problem of Golrezaei et al. (2014), by allowing each item be offered at different prices.
We note that the assortment offered S can be constrained to lie in an arbitrary downward-closed
family F of subsets of {(i, j) : i∈ [n], j ∈ [mi]}; for example, we could disallow assortments where an
item is simultaneously offered at multiple prices. The execution of an algorithm can be encapsulated
by the following modification of the LP (5):
max
T∑
t=1
∑
S∈F
xt(S)
∑
(i,j)∈S
r
(j)
i p
(j)
t,i (S) (30a)
T∑
t=1
∑
S∈F
xt(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
p
(j)
t,i (S)≤ ki i∈ [n] (30b)
∑
S∈F
xt(S) = 1 t∈ [T ] (30c)
xt(S)≥ 0 t∈ [T ], S ∈F (30d)
Multi-price Balance can be directly applied to this problem, with the change that it offers
the assortment S ∈ F maximizing expected pseudorevenue, ∑(i,j)∈S p(j)t,i (S)(Φ˜i(L˜(j)i )− Φ˜i(wi)), to
27
each customer t. We assume the existence of an oracle for solving this single-shot assortment
optimization problem, which admits an efficient algorithm under many commonly-used choice
models (see Cheung and Simchi-Levi (2016) for a summary). In the analysis, dual constraints (19b)
now require zt ≥
∑
(i,j)∈S p
(j)
t,i (S)(r
(j)
i −yi) for all t and S, which is still implied by the conditions of
Theorem 4 as long as the choice probabilities for customers satisfy a mild substitutability assumption
(see Golrezaei et al. (2014) for details).
7. Simulations on Hotel Data Set of Bodea et al. (2009)
We test our algorithms on the publicly-accessible hotel data set collected by Bodea et al. (2009).
Based on the data, we consider a multi-price online assortment problem, as defined in Section 6.
7.1. Experimental Setup
We consider Hotel 1 from the data set, which has more transactions than the other four hotels. For
each transaction, we use booking to refer to the date the transaction occurred, and occupancy to
refer to the dates the customer will stay in the hotel. We consider occupancies spanning the 5-week
period from Sunday, March 11th, 2007 to Sunday, April 15th, 2007. Although the data contains
occupancies for a couple of weeks outside this range, such transactions are sparse.
We merge the different rooms into 4 categories: King rooms, Queen rooms, Suites, and Two-
double rooms. Rooms under the same category draw from the same inventory. We merge the
different fare classes into two: discounted advance-purchase fares and regular rack rates. We use
product to refer to any of the 8 combinations formed by the 4 room categories and 2 fares.
We estimate a Multinomial Logit (MNL) choice model on these 8 products, for each of 8 cus-
tomer types. The customer types are based on the booking channel, party size, and VIP status
(if any) associated with a transaction. These types capture preference heterogeneity (for example,
party sizes greater than 1 tend to prefer Suites and Two-double rooms). The details of our choice
estimation are deferred to Appendix F.
We should point out that more sophisticated segmentation and estimation techniques have been
employed on this data set (van Ryzin and Vulcano 2014, Newman et al. 2014). Nonetheless, MNL
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has been reported to perform relatively well (van Ryzin and Vulcano 2014, sec. 5.2). The MNL
choice model is convenient for our purposes because under it, both the assortment optimization
problem, as well as the choice-based LP (30) with exponentially many variables, can be solved
efficiently (Talluri and Van Ryzin 2004, Liu and Van Ryzin 2008, Cheung and Simchi-Levi 2016).
We treat each occupancy date as a separate instance of the problem, for which we define a
sequence of arrivals, with one arrival for each transaction which occupies that date. The choice
probabilities for each arrival are determined by the customer type associated with the correspond-
ing transaction.5 The number of days in advance of occupancy that each arrival occurred is also
recorded, but this information is only relevant for algorithms which attempt to forecast the remain-
ing number of arrivals based on the remaining length of time.
Before we proceed, we discuss the limitations of our analysis and the data set:
1. In the data set, 55% of the transactions occupy multiple, consecutive days. However, we treat
such a transaction as a separate arrival in the instances for each of those occupancy dates.
While this is a simplifying assumption, the focus of our paper is on the basic allocation problem
without complementarity effects across consecutive days, and our goal in using the data set
is to extract an arrival pattern over time.
2. It is not possible to deduce from the data the fixed capacity for each category of room. To
compensate, we consider a wide range of starting capacities in our tests.
3. Estimating the number of customers who do not make a purchase is a standard challenge in
choice modeling, which is exacerbated in this data set by the fact that the arrivals are rather
non-stationary. We test various assumptions on the weight of the no-purchase option in the
MNL model for each customer type. In general, we assume that this weight is large, which
causes the revenue-maximizing assortments to be large, allowing for tension between offering
large assortments which maximize immediate revenue, and offering small assortments which
regulate inventory consumption (details in Appendix F).
5 The choice realized in that transaction was used for choice model estimation, but is not used in defining the arrival.
29
Table 1 Details on Room Categories and Fares
Room Category Low Fare High Fare Fraction of Rooms
King $307 $361 52%
Queen $304 $361 15%
Suite $384 $496 13%
Two Double $306 $342 20%
7.2. Instance Definition
A test instance corresponds to a specific occupancy date, which has a finite inventory of each room
category. Each customer interested in that occupancy date arrives in sequence, after which her
characteristics (channel, party size, VIP status) are revealed. The problem is to show a personalized
assortment of (room, fare)-options to each customer. The instances we test are described below.
• Arrival sequence: 35 possibilities, one for each day in the 5-week occupancy period. We multiply
the arrivals by 10 (i.e. instead of a type-1 customer followed by a type-2 customer, we have
10 type-1 customers followed by 10 type-2 customers), being interested in the high-inventory
regime. After multiplication, the average number of arrivals per day is 1340, peaking on
Sundays and Mondays, although the number and breakdown of customers varies by day.
• Number of products: 8 (room, fare)-combinations, identical for all instances.
• Prices of products: displayed in Table 1, identical for all instances. These prices were deter-
mined by taking the average price of that (room, fare)-combination over all transactions.
• Starting inventories: 3 possibilities, where we set the starting inventories to yield a desired
loading factor. The loading factor is defined by the average (over all 35 days) number of
customers per unit of starting inventory, and we use the same loading factors (1.4, 1.6, 1.8)
as Golrezaei et al. (2014). For a fixed loading factor, all 35 instances have the same starting
inventories. The fraction of total starting inventory corresponding to each room type is based
on the relative frequency with which that type is booked over all transactions (see Table 1).
We test additional synthetic instances, where we increase the high fares and consider a greater
range of loading factors, in Subsection 7.5.
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7.3. Algorithms Compared
We compare the performances of 10 algorithms on each instance.
First we describe the forecast-independent algorithms we test.
1. Myopic: offer each customer the assortment maximizing immediate expected revenue, from
the items that have not stocked out.
2. Conservative: only offer items at their maximum prices.6
3. GNR: offer to each customer t the assortment S maximizing
∑
(i,j)∈S
p
(j)
t,i (S) · r(j)i Ψ(wi),
where wi is the fraction of item i sold and Ψ is the inventory balancing function from Golrezaei
et al. (2014). This would represent the algorithm of Golrezaei et al. (2014) applied to the
multi-price setting (see Section 1.2).
4. Our Algorithm: offer to each customer t the assortment S maximizing
∑
(i,j)∈S
p
(j)
t,i (S) · (r(j)i −ΦPi(wi)), (31)
where wi is the fraction of item i sold. This is essentially Multi-price Balance, except we
have used the fixed value function ΦPi instead of the random value function Φ˜i to define the
bid price of each item i, which is a simplifying approximation for the high-inventory regime.
The Myopic and Conservative algorithms represent two extremes, where the former extracts the
maximum in expectation from every customer and is optimal as the loading factor approaches 0,
while the latter extracts the maximum from every unit of inventory and is optimal as the loading
factor approaches ∞. In-between these extremes, our algorithm attempts to balance revenue-per-
customer and revenue-per-item as it selects items and prices to put in the assortment.
Next we describe the forecasting-based algorithms we test. These algorithms all estimate the
number of each type of customer yet to arrive, and then incorporate this information into the
6 This algorithm selects between the items (at their high prices) using the algorithm of Golrezaei et al. (2014).
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LP (30) to set bid prices. They differ in how they perform the forecasting, and how frequently
they update the bid prices by re-solving the LP. Further details about these algorithms, as well as
discussion of alternative algorithms, are deferred to Appendix F.1.
5. One-shot LP: solve the LP only once, at the start, using the average number of customers
of each type to appear on a given day.
6. LP Resolving: re-solve the LP every 100 arrivals, using updated forecasts and inventory
counts. During each re-solve, the estimated number of remaining customers is updated, taking
into account the length of time remaining until occupancy, and the number of customers that
have arrived. The estimated type breakdown is fixed, based on the aggregate distribution.
7. LP Learning: same as LP Resolving, except the estimated type breakdown is also updated,
based on the empirical distribution observed thus far.
8. LP Clairvoyant: same as LP Resolving, but given the true number of customers of each type
remaining.
Finally, we describe the hybrid algorithms we test. These algorithms combine a forecasting
algorithm with “Our Algorithm” as described above, based on a parameter γ > 1. For each customer
t, the hybrid algorithm considers the expected pseudorevenue (as defined in (31)) of the assortment
Sfcst suggested by the forecasting algorithm. If this is at least 1
γ
of the maximum value of (31) over
all assortments S, then the hybrid algorithm offers Sfcst. Otherwise, the hybrid algorithm offers the
assortment suggested by our algorithm, which maximizes (31) by definition.
9. Resolve-1.5: hybrid algorithm based on LP Resolving and parameter γ = 1.5.
10. Learn-1.5: hybrid algorithm based on LP Learning and parameter γ = 1.5.
We selected γ = 1.5 above by taking the better of the two values 1.5,2.0 tested in Golrezaei et al.
(2014). We did not search over γ > 1 for the best γ, as the reported performance of such a hybrid
algorithm would be greatly inflated, since γ would be chosen after seeing the performance.
7.4. Results
On every instance, we express the performance of each algorithm as a percentage of the LP upper
bound. That is, we take the expected revenue of the algorithm (approximated over 10 runs), and
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Table 2 The percentages of optimum achieved by different algorithms. The 3 highest percentages in each row are bolded. The 3 lowest
standard deviations in each row are italicized.
Loading Forecast-independent Forecast-dependent Hybrid
Factor Myopic Conservative GNR OurAlg One-shot Resolve Learn Clairvoyant Resolve-1.5 Learn-1.5
1.4
Mean 0.974 0.940 0.973 0.976 0.973 0.962 0.958 0.991 0.977 0.977
Stdev 0.023 0.034 0.020 0.013 0.016 0.039 0.041 0.008 0.018 0.020
1.6
Mean 0.965 0.960 0.964 0.971 0.964 0.961 0.963 0.990 0.977 0.978
Stdev 0.025 0.036 0.020 0.014 0.021 0.031 0.030 0.008 0.008 0.010
1.8
Mean 0.957 0.972 0.960 0.968 0.808 0.962 0.968 0.990 0.977 0.977
Stdev 0.020 0.036 0.017 0.012 0.100 0.029 0.023 0.009 0.008 0.007
divide it by the optimal objective value of the LP (30) with the true arrival sequence. In Table 2,
we report the mean and standard deviation of each algorithm’s percentages over the 35 arrival
sequences, for each loading factor.
In general, our Multi-price Balance algorithm is the most profitable and consistent among
the forecast-independent algorithms, while the forecast-dependent algorithms have much greater
fluctuation in their performance for different occupancy days, depending on how accurate their
forecasts were for that day. LP Learning is slightly better than the others, but is most prone to
overfitting in its forecasts. We note that although the forecast-independent algorithms do not make
use of information about the remaining time horizon (which can be used to estimate the remaining
number of customers), they perform comparably well to the forecasting algorithms. Nonetheless,
by combining the forecasting algorithms with Multi-price Balance, the hybrid algorithms are
able to correct for forecast overconfidence and achieve the best performance overall (aside from
the Clairvoyant algorithm, which has a perfect forecast of the future). We find that although the
hybrid algorithm only changes a small fraction (≈ 5%) of the forecasting algorithm’s decisions, this
drastically improves the profitability and consistency.
7.5. Results under Greater Fare Differentiation
The instances tested in Subsection 7.4 were “easy” in that there was not so much difference between
selling rooms at their low or high fares. In this subsection, we synthetically modify the higher fare
for each room category to be twice its lower fare. We also increase the utility of the no-purchase
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Figure 3 Algorithm performances in the setting with greater fare differentiation. The lines corre-
sponding to the two hybrid algorithms, which perform the best overall, have been bolded.
option in the MNL model for each customer type (see Appendix F), to maintain the tension between
low fares which maximize expected revenue, and high fares which limit inventory consumption.
Furthermore, we test a complete range of loading factors, including both the extreme where
the Myopic algorithm is optimal, and the extreme where the Conservative algorithm is optimal.
In Figure 3, we plot the average percentages of optimum attained by each algorithm over the 35
arrival sequences, for each loading factor.
The conclusion again is that our two hybrid algorithms, which use forecasts but continuously
reference our forecast-independent value functions, are the most profitable and consistent. Note
that our Multi-price Balance algorithm comes third, and performs significantly better than the
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inventory-balancing algorithm of Golrezaei et al. (2014), which is similar to the Myopic algorithm
as it does not take the two different prices of the same item into account.
However, it is important to note that overall, our methodology is only relevant in scenarios where
the loading factor is in-between the extremes where there is a non-trivial tradeoff. If the loading
factor is very low, and the hotel does not even get close to full on any day, then it would be best
to always use the Myopic algorithm; similarly, if the loading factor is very high, and the hotel gets
full every day, then it would be best to always use the Conservative algorithm. Nonetheless, we
argue that most hotels do lie in-between the extremes, where it is sometimes full and sometimes
empty depending on sudden local events. Otherwise, the hotel either over-built or under-built in
an higher-order decision.
8. Conclusion
Competitive analysis is a well-established methodology in sequential decision-making problems,
providing a baseline decision in the absence of a reliable forecast of the future. Previously, online
resource allocation algorithms based on competitive analysis have assumed that each resource
can only be converted to reward at a fixed rate. We extend these results and derive algorithms
which jointly consider the tradeoffs between different resources and different reward rates. This
broadly expands the applicability of competitive analysis in areas such as online matching, online
advertising, personalized e-commerce, and appointment scheduling.
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Appendix A: Deferred Proofs from Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix any adaptive algorithm (which knows the arrival sequence, but not the
realizations of the customers’ purchase decisions, at the start) and consider its execution on setup S
with arrival sequenceA. Let X(j)t,i be the indicator random variable (0 or 1) for the algorithm offering
item i at price j to customer t, and P
(j)
t,i be the indicator random variable for customer t accepting
when item i is offered to her at price j. On a given run, the constraints
∑T
t=1
∑mi
j=1P
(j)
t,i X
(j)
t,i ≤ ki and∑n
i=1
∑mi
j=1X
(j)
t,i ≤ 1 are satisfied. Therefore, they are still satisfied after taking an expectation over
all runs, and furthermore we can use independence to show that E[P (j)t,i X
(j)
t,i ] = E[P
(j)
t,i ] ·E[X(j)t,i ] =
p
(j)
t,i x
(j)
t,i . Therefore, the algorithm must satisfy constraints (5b) and (5c) of the LP. Since its revenue
on a given run is
∑T
t=1
∑n
i=1
∑mi
j=1P
(j)
t,i r
(j)
i X
(j)
t,i , taking an expectation over it yields (5a), completing
the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The statement for σ(j), . . . , σ(j) is immediate from the fact that the
explicit value of σ(j) is (1− r(j−1)
r(j)
)(1 +
∑m
j′=2(1− r
(j′−1)
r(j
′) ))
−1, for all j ∈ [m]. To prove the statement
for α(1), . . . , α(m), we show that the solution to the system of n equations formed by (7) and
α(1) + . . . α(m) = 1 is unique and strictly positive.
Let γ(j) = e−α
(j)
for all j. Then the constraint α(1) + . . . α(m) = 1 can be rewritten as
∏m
j=1 γ
(j) = 1
e
.
Furthermore, we derive from (7) that for all j > 1, γ(j) = (1− r(j−1)
r(j)
)γ(1) + r
(j−1)
r(j)
. Therefore,
γ(1) ·
m∏
j=2
((
1− r
(j−1)
r(j)
)
γ(1) +
r(j−1)
r(j)
)
=
1
e
. (32)
Consider the LHS of (32) as a function of γ(1) on [ 1
e
,1]. This is a continuous, strictly increasing
function which is at most 1
e
when γ(1) = 1
e
and 1 when γ(1) = 1. Therefore, there is a unique solution
with γ(1) ∈ [ 1
e
,1), and the resulting value of α(1) is positive. For j > 1, since γ(j) can also be written
as γ(1) + r
(j−1)
r(j)
(1− γ(1)), it can be seen that γ(j) ∈ [ 1
e
,1), hence the unique value for α(j) is positive
as well. 
Proof of Proposition 2. For the first inequality in (11), observe that f(x) = x
1−e−x is a strictly
increasing function on [0,1]. Since σ(1) ∈ (0,1), σ(1)
1−e−σ(1)
< 1
1− 1e
, which is the desired result.
For the second inequality in (11), we show α(1) >σ(1), by showing that for all j = 2, . . . ,m, α(j) is
a smaller multiple of α(1) than σ(j) is of σ(1). This suffices because both the fractions α(1), . . . , α(m)
and σ(1), . . . , σ(m) must sum to 1. For a given j, we must establish that α
(j)
α(1)
< σ
(j)
σ(1)
. By definition,
σ(j)
σ(1)
= 1− r(j−1)
r(j)
= 1−e
−α(j)
1−e−α(1)
. Therefore, is suffices to show that α
(j)
α(1)
< 1−e
−α(j)
1−e−α(1)
, or α
(j)
1−e−α(j)
< α
(1)
1−e−α(1)
.
This follows from the fact that the function f(x) = x
1−e−x is strictly increasing.
To prove (12), note that σ(1) = (1 +
∑m
j=2(1− r
(j−1)
r(j)
))−1, while 1 + ln r
(m)
r(1)
= 1 +
∑m
j=2 ln
r(j)
r(j−1) .
Therefore, it suffices to show that for any j = 2, . . . ,m, ln r
(j)
r(j−1) > 1− r
(j−1)
r(j)
. Letting x= ln r
(j−1)
r(j)
< 0,
the desired inequality becomes −x> 1− ex, which is immediate.
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For (13), we would like to prove that α<α(1). Note that α(1) is the unique solution to
α(1) +
m∑
j=2
[
− ln (1− (1− e−α(1))(1− r(j−1)
r(j)
)
)]
= 1, (33)
while α is the unique solution to
α+
m∑
j=2
(1− e−α) ln r
(j)
r(j−1)
= 1. (34)
The LHS of (33), as a function of α(1), is increasing over (0,1); the same can be said about the
LHS of (34) as a function of α. Therefore, it suffices to show that if α(1) = α= x, then the LHS of
(33) is strictly less than the LHS of (34), for all x∈ (0,1).
Let F = 1− e−x and consider any j > 1. Let s= r(j−1)
r(j)
∈ (0,1). It suffices to show that − ln(1−
F (1 − s)) < F · ln 1
s
, which can be rearranged as 1−s
F
1−s > F . For the final inequality, note that
f(s) = sF is a strictly concave function on (0,1), since F ∈ (0,1). Therefore, 1−sF
1−s >F , because the
LHS is the slope of the secant line through (s, sF ) and (1,1), while the RHS is the slope of the
tangent line through (1,1). 
Appendix B: Supplement to Section 3
The first subsection contains the deferred proofs from Section 3. In the second subsection, we
explain how to optimize the randomized procedure for generating a single value function. In the
third subsection, we put together the proof of Theorem 1.
The following inequality will be useful throughout the paper. For all j = 2, . . . ,m, (7) says that
1−e−α(j) ≤ 1− r(j−1)
r(j)
, where we have used the fact that 1−e−α(1) ≤ 1. Therefore, for all j = 2, . . . ,m,
we can derive that
r(j−1)
r(j)
≤ e−α(j) . (35)
B.1. Deferred Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4. Define Nt,i to be the algorithm’s value for Ni at the end of time t (N0,i
is understood to be 0), for all t ∈ [T ] and i ∈ [n]. For all t ∈ [T ], define Rt = r(j
∗
t )
i∗t
and Zt =
Φ˜i∗t (L˜
(j∗t )
i∗t
)− Φ˜i∗t (Ni∗t /ki∗t ) if a sale was made during time t; define Rt =Zt = 0 otherwise.
Consider the solution to the dual LP (19) formed by setting yi = E[Φ˜i(
NT,i
ki
)] for all i ∈ [n], and
zt =E[Zt] for all t∈ [T ]. We claim that this solution is feasible. The non-negativity constraint (19c)
can be verified directly from the definitions.
Now, consider constraint (19b) for a fixed t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [n], j ∈ [mi]. Given the initializations of
L˜
(1)
i , . . . , L˜
(mi)
i , Φ˜i and the value of Nt−1,i, the algorithm will always make a decision during time t
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which earns pseudorevenue whose conditional expectation is at least p
(j)
t,i (Φ˜i(L˜
(j)
i )− Φ˜i(Nt−1,iki )), by
definition (16). Formally,
E[Zt|L˜(1)i , . . . , L˜(mi)i , Φ˜i,Nt−1,i]≥ p(j)t,i (Φ˜i(L˜(j)i )− Φ˜i(
Nt−1,i
ki
)),
for all values of L˜
(1)
i , . . . , L˜
(mi)
i , Φ˜i,Nt−1,i. By the tower property of conditional expectation, zt =
E[Zt] ≥ E[p(j)t,i (Φ˜i(L˜(j)i ) − Φ˜i(Nt−1,iki ))]. Meanwhile, yi has been set to E[Φ˜i(
NT,i
ki
)]. Since NT,i ≥
Nt−1,i and Φ˜i is increasing, yi ≥ E[Φ˜i(Nt−1,iki )]. Therefore, the LHS of (19b), p
(j)
t,i yi + zt, is at least
E[p(j)t,i (Φ˜i(L˜
(j)
i ))]. By (18), this is at least r
(j)
i , completing the proof of feasibility.
Applying weak duality, we obtain
OPT(S,A)≤
n∑
i=1
kiE[Φ˜i(
NT,i
ki
)] +
T∑
t=1
E[Zt]
=
n∑
i=1
kiE
[ T∑
t=1
(Φ˜i(
Nt,i
ki
)− Φ˜i(Nt−1,i
ki
))
]
+
T∑
t=1
E[Zt]
=
T∑
t=1
E
[ n∑
i=1
ki(Φ˜i(
Nt,i
ki
)− Φ˜i(Nt−1,i
ki
)) +Zt
]
. (36)
We now analyze the term inside the expectation,
n∑
i=1
ki(Φ˜i(
Nt,i
ki
)− Φ˜i(Nt−1,i
ki
)) +Zt, (37)
for every t∈ [T ]. We would like to argue that it is at most Rt
c
, on every sample path.
There are two cases. If an item i= i∗t was sold at price j = j
∗
t during time t, then (37) equals
ki(Φ˜i(
Nt−1,i + 1
ki
)− Φ˜i(Nt−1,i
ki
)) + Φ˜i(L˜
(j)
i )− Φ˜i(
Nt−1,i
ki
). (38)
Indeed, Nt,i = Nt−1,i + 1, Nt,i = Nt−1,i for all i 6= i, and Zt = Φ˜i(L˜(j)i )− Φ˜i(Nt−1,iki ) by definition.
Furthermore, since Zt is positive, Nt−1,i must by less than L˜
(j)
i k. Therefore, we can invoke (17) to
get that (38) is at most r
(j)
i /c, which is equal to
Rt
c
by definition. In the other case, if no item was
sold during time t, then (38) is 0, while Rt = 0 too, so (38) is still at most
Rt
c
.
Substituting back into (36), we conclude that OPT(S,A) ≤ ∑Tt=1E[Rtc ], which is equal to
1
c
E[ALG(S,A)] by definition. This completes the proof of Algorithm 1 having a competitive ratio
at least c. 
Proof of Proposition 3. For (21), note that E[L˜(j)] = bL
(j)kc+1
k
(L(j)k − bL(j)kc) + bL(j)kc
k
(1 −
(L(j)k−bL(j)kc)) = 1
k
(L(j)k−bL(j)kc) + bL(j)kc
k
=L(j).
For (22), note that |(L˜(j)− L˜(j′))− (L(j)−L(j′))|= |(L˜(j)−L(j))− (L˜(j′)−L(j′))|. We will prove
that (L˜(j)−L(j))− (L˜(j′)−L(j′))≤ 1
k
; the inequality that (L˜(j)−L(j))− (L˜(j′)−L(j′))≥− 1
k
follows
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by symmetry. The maximum value of kL˜(j) is bkL(j)c+ 1 while the minimum value of kL˜(j′) is
bkL(j′)c, hence the result is immediate unless (bkL(j)c + 1) − kL(j) + kL(j′) − bkL(j′)c > 1, i.e.
kL(j
′) − bkL(j′)c> kL(j) − bkL(j)c. However, in this case, if kL˜(j) = bkL(j)c+ 1, then W < kL(j) −
bkL(j)c<kL(j′)−bkL(j′)c and hence L˜(j′) is rounded up as well. Similarly, if L˜(j′) is rounded down,
then L˜(j) must be rounded down as well. If L˜(j) and L˜(j
′) are rounded in the same direction, then
(iii) holds. 
Proof of Theorem 5. First we prove (18), the claim that E[Φ˜(L˜(j))]≥ r(j), inductively. Clearly
E[Φ(L˜(0))]≥ r(0) = 0. Now consider j ∈ [m] and suppose we have established (18) for the j−1 case.
We can compare expression (20) with q = L˜(j) and q = L˜(j−1) to obtain Φ˜(L˜(j)) = Φ˜(L˜(j)) + (r(j)−
r(j−1)) exp(L˜
(j)−L˜(j−1))−1
exp(α(j))−1 . Therefore,
E[Φ˜(L˜(j))]≥ r(j−1) + (r(j)− r(j−1))E[exp(L˜
(j)− L˜(j−1))]− 1
exp(α(j))− 1
≥ r(j−1) + (r(j)− r(j−1))exp(E[L˜
(j)− L˜(j−1)])− 1
exp(α(j))− 1
= r(j−1) + (r(j)− r(j−1))exp(α
(j))− 1
exp(α(j))− 1
where the first inequality uses the induction hypothesis, and the second inequality uses Jensen’s
inequality (the exponential function exp is convex). The equality follows from (21) and the definition
that α(j) =L(j)−L(j−1), completing the induction.
Now we prove (17) for an arbitrary j ∈ [m] and N ∈ {0, . . . , L˜(j)k − 1}. Let q = N
k
and ` =
˜`(q). Note that 1≤ `≤ j, and L˜(`−1) ≤ q < L˜(`). Substituting q = N
k
into the LHS of (17), we get
k
(
Φ˜(q+ 1
k
)− Φ˜(q))+ Φ˜(L˜(j))− Φ˜(q). Adding and subtracting Φ˜(L˜(`)) and rearranging, we get
k
(
Φ˜(q+
1
k
)− Φ˜(q))+ Φ˜(L˜(`))− Φ˜(q) + Φ˜(L˜(j))− Φ˜(L˜(`)). (39)
The following upper bound can be derived for expression (39):
k
(
Φ˜(q+
1
k
)− Φ˜(q))+ Φ˜(L˜(`))− Φ˜(q) + Φ˜(L˜(j))− Φ˜(L˜(`))
=(r(`)− r(`−1))e
q+1/k−L˜(`−1)(k− (k+ 1)e−1/k) + eL˜(`)−L˜(`−1)
eα(`) − 1 +
j∑
`′=`+1
(r(`
′)− r(`′−1))e
L˜(`
′)−L˜(`′−1) − 1
eα(`
′) − 1
≤(r(`)− r(`−1))e
L˜(`)−L˜(`−1)(k− (k+ 1)e−1/k) + eL˜(`)−L˜(`−1)
eα(`) − 1 +
j∑
`′=`+1
(r(`
′)− r(`′−1))e
L˜(`
′)−L˜(`′−1) − 1
eα(`
′) − 1
=(r(`)− r(`−1))e
L˜(`)−L˜(`−1)−α(`)(1 + k)(1− e−1/k)
1− e−α(`) +
j∑
`′=`+1
(r(`
′)− r(`′−1))e
L˜(`
′)−L˜(`′−1)−α(`′) − e−α(`
′)
1− e−α(`′)
. (40)
The inequality holds because k− (1 + k)e−1/k > 0 for all k ∈N, and q is at most L˜(`)− 1/k.
It suffices to show that expression (40) is bounded from above by
r(j)
(1 + k)(e1/k− 1)
1− e−α(1) . (41)
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To assist in this task, we would like to establish the following for all `′ = ` + 1, . . . , j and `′′ ∈
{`, . . . , `′− 1}:
(r(`
′−1)− r(`′−2))e
L˜(`
′−1)−L˜(`′′−1)−L(`′−1)+L(`′′−1)(1 + k)(1− e−1/k)
1− e−α(`′−1)
+ (r(`
′)− r(`′−1))e
L˜(`
′)−L˜(`′−1)−α(`′) − e−α(`
′)
1− e−α(`′)
≤(r(`′)− r(`′−1))e
max{L˜(`′)−L˜(`′′−1)−L(`′)+L(`′′−1),L˜(`′)−L˜(`′−1)−L(`′)+L(`′−1)}(1 + k)(1− e−1/k)
1− e−α(`′)
. (42)
But r
(`′−1)−r(`′−2)
1−e−α(`′−1)
= r
(`′)−r(`′−1)
1−e−α(`′)
· r(`
′−1)
r(`
′) due to the definition of α in (7), and
r(`
′−1)
r(`
′) ≤ e−α
(`′)
due to
(35). Substituting back into inequality (42), it suffices to prove
eL˜
(`′−1)−L˜(`′′−1)−L(`′)+L(`′′−1)(1 + k)(1− e−1/k) + eL˜(`
′)−L˜(`′−1)−α(`′) − e−α(`
′)
≤emax{L˜(`
′)−L˜(`′′−1)−L(`′)+L(`′′−1),L˜(`′)−L˜(`′−1)−L(`′)+L(`′−1)}(1 + k)(1− e−1/k)
where we have used Definition 1 to rewrite the first exponent. Now,
eL˜
(`′−1)−L˜(`′′−1)−L(`′)+L(`′′−1)(k− (1 + k)e−1/k)≤ eL˜(`
′)−L˜(`′′−1)−L(`′)+L(`′′−1)(k− (1 + k)1− e−1/k),
since k− (1 + k)e−1/k > 0 and L˜(`′−1) ≤ L˜(`′). Thus it remains to prove that
eL˜
(`′−1)−L˜(`′′−1)−L(`′)+L(`′′−1) +eL˜
(`′)−L˜(`′−1)−α(`′)−e−α(`
′) ≤ emax{L˜(`
′)−L˜(`′′−1)−L(`′)+L(`′′−1),L˜(`′)−L˜(`′−1)−L(`′)+L(`′−1)}.
(43)
We consider two cases. First suppose L˜(`
′)− L˜(`′′−1)−L(`′) +L(`′′−1) ≤ L˜(`′)− L˜(`′−1)−L(`′) +L(`′−1),
i.e. L˜(`
′−1) − L˜(`′′−1) ≤ L(`′−1) −L(`′′−1). Then the LHS of (43) equals e−α(`
′)
+ eL˜
(`′)−L˜(`′−1)−α(`′) −
e−α
(`′)
= eL˜
(`′)−L˜(`′−1)−α(`′) , which equals the RHS of (43) by the assumption that L˜(`
′−1)− L˜(`′′−1) ≤
L(`
′−1)−L(`′′−1). In the second case, suppose L˜(`′)− L˜(`′′−1)−L(`′) +L(`′′−1) > L˜(`′)− L˜(`′−1)−L(`′) +
L(`
′−1), i.e. L˜(`
′−1)− L˜(`′′−1) >L(`′−1)−L(`′′−1). Then inequality (43) can be rearranged as
e−α
(`′)
(eL˜
(`′−1)−L˜(`′′−1)−L(`′−1)+L(`′′−1) − 1)(eL˜(`
′)−L˜(`′−1) − 1)≥ 0.
The first bracket is positive by the assumption that L˜(`
′−1) − L˜(`′′−1) > L(`′−1) − L(`′′−1) and the
second bracket is non-negative since L˜(`
′−1) ≤ L˜(`′). This finishes the proof of (43), and hence (42).
Equipped with (42), we return the task of proving that expression (40) is at most expression (41).
If we inductively apply inequality (42) to expression (40) for `′ = `+1, . . . , j (when `′ = `+1, `′′ = `;
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when `′ = `+ 2, `′′ = ` if we arrived at case two during iteration `+ 1 and `′′ = `+ 1 otherwise,...),
we conclude that expression (40) is bounded from above by
(r(j)− r(j−1))e
L˜(j)−L˜(`′′−1)−L(j)+L(`′′−1)(1 + k)(1− e−1/k)
1− e−α(j)
for some `′′ ∈ {`, . . . , j}. The fact that 1− e−α(1) = r(j)
r(j)−r(j−1) (1− e−α
(j)
), due to (7), and the fact
that (L˜(j) − L˜(`′′−1))− (L(j) − L(`′′−1)) ≤ 1/k, due to (22), complete the proof of expression (40)
being at most expression (41), and thus the proof of Theorem 5 for general m.
Finally, when m= 1, α(1) = 1. In the above proof, since j and ` are always 1, (40) can be replaced
by r(1) · (1)(1+k)(1−e−1/k)
1−e−1 , where we have used the fact that L
(1) = k always. This is immediately at
most r
(j)
c
, for the improved value of c = 1−e
−α(1)
(1+k)(1−e−1/k) , completing the proof of Theorem 5 in its
entirety. 
B.2. Optimizing the Randomized Procedure
We can explicitly formulate the optimization problem over randomized procedures for a single item
with starting inventory k and m prices r(1), . . . , r(m). Using the “balls in bins” counting argument,
the number of configurations satisfying (14) is D :=
(
k+m−1
m−1
)
.
We refer to these configurations in an arbitrary order using the index d ∈ [D], where we let ρd
denote the probability of choosing configuration d, fd(·) denote the value function for d, and L(j)d
denote the value of L˜(j) under configuration d for all j = 0, . . . ,m. The optimization problem of
satisfying (17)–(18) with a maximal value of c can be formulated as follows:
F˜ := sup c (44a)
k(fd(
N + 1
k
)− fd(N
k
)) + fd(L
(j)
d )− fd(
N
k
)≤ r
(j)
c
d∈ [D], j ∈ [m],0≤N ≤ kL(j)d − 1 (44b)
fd(1)≥ . . .≥ fd( 1
k
)≥ fd(0) = 0 d∈ [D] (44c)
D∑
d=1
ρdfd(L
(j)
d )≥ r(j) j ∈ [m] (44d)
D∑
d=1
ρd = 1 (44e)
fd(0), fd(
1
k
), . . . , fd(1)∈R;ρd ≥ 0 d∈ [D] (44f)
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Constraint (44b) corresponds to (17), constraint (44d) corresponds to (18), while constraint (44c)
enforces the definition of a value function in (15). We let F˜ denote the optimal objective value
of (44). Unfortunately, it is difficult to solve (44) exactly, since the number of configurations D is
exponential in the number of prices m, and constraint (44d) is non-linear.
Nonetheless, (44) is useful at determining the best competitive ratio which could be established
using our analysis. We know that the randomized procedure from Definition 3 (based on Φ) is an
optimal solution to (44) as k→∞, since it achieves the optimal competitive ratio possible.
We can also solve (44) exactly when k = 1, in which case D = m, where we will let d ∈ [D]
denote the configuration with L˜(0) = . . . = L˜(d−1) = 0 and L˜(d) = . . . = L˜(m) = 1. (44b) reduces to
2fd(1) ≤ r(j)c , and needs to hold for d ∈ [D], j ≥ d (for j < d, kL(j)d − 1 = −1). However, clearly
only the constraint with j = d is binding. As a result, (44b) corresponds to m constraints. (44d)
corresponds to m constraints of the form
∑j
d=1 ρdfd(1)≥ r(j), for j ∈ [m].
Not counting fd(0), which must be set to 0, there are 2m+ 1 variables: {fd(1), ρd : d∈ [D]} and
c. Consider the system of equations obtained in these 2m+1 variables by setting (44b), (44d), and
(44e) to equality. It can be checked that the unique solution is
fd(1) =
r(d)
σ(1)
,∀d∈ [D];ρd = σ(d),∀d∈ [D]; c= σ
(1)
2
(45)
with σ(1), . . . , σ(m) defined from r(1), . . . , r(m) according to (8). Furthermore, this solution is both
feasible, satisfying the non-negativity constraints in (44c) and (44f), and optimal. Therefore, the
value of F˜ is σ
(1)
2
.
B.3. Proof of Theorem 1
Now we put together the proof of Theorem 1. For all items i∈ [n], F˜i is defined to be the optimal
objective value of (44), with k= ki, m=mi, and r
(1) = r
(1)
i , . . . , r
(m) = r
(mi)
i . Consider Algorithm 1,
where for all i, the randomized procedure used to initialize Φ˜i is an optimal solution to (44)
achieving the objective value of F˜i. For all i, (17)–(18) is satisfied as long as c ≤ F˜i. Therefore,
the maximum value of c satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4 is mini F˜i. By Theorem 4, this
algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of mini F˜i.
45
To establish bounds (i)–(iii) from Theorem 1, for all i, we need to find a feasible randomized
procedure with an objective value in (44) equal to the bound. For bounds (i) and (iii), this is
established directly by the randomized procedure from Definition 3, via the statement of Theorem 5.
For bound (ii), we need to split the ki units of item i into ki disparate items. For each single-
unit item, its value function in Algorithm 1 is initialized according to the randomized procedure
described by (45). This yields a value of
σ
(1)
i
2
, completing the proof of Theorem 1.
Appendix C: Deferred Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Lemma 2. Since the algorithm was willing to sell item i at price j, it must be the case
that Wi <L
(j)
i . Let ` denote `i(Wi), which is at most j. We ignore measure-zero events and assume
that Wi 6=L(`−1). We can rearrange Zt as
r
(j)
i − r(`)i + r(`)i −
(
r
(`−1)
i + (r
(`)
i − r(`−1)i )
exp(Wi−L(`−1)i )− 1
exp(α
(`)
i )− 1
)
= r
(j)
i − r(`)i + (r(`)i − r(`−1)i )
exp(α
(`)
i )− exp(Wi−L(`−1)i )
exp(α
(`)
i )− 1
.
Adding Yi = Φ
′
Pi(Wi) = (r
(`)
i −r(`−1)i ) exp(Wi−L
(`−1)
i )
exp(α
(`)
i )−1
to this expression, we get r
(j)
i −r(`)i + r
(`)
i −r
(`−1)
i
1−exp(−α(`)i )
,
which can be re-written as r
(j)
i − r(`)i + r
(`)
i
1−exp(−α(1)i )
due to (7). The result follows immediately. 
Proof of Lemma 3. It suffices to show that constraint (19b) holds for all t∈ [T ] and i∈ [n]. Since
p
(j)
t,i ∈ {0,1} and the constraint clearly holds when p(j)t,i = 0, it suffices to show that E[Yi+Zt]≥ r(jt,i)i ,
where jt,i 6= 0. We will let j = jt,i for brevity.
Fix the realization of Wi′ for all i
′ 6= i, and consider the run of the algorithm on a modified setup
with item i removed. Having fixed the values of Wi′ , such a run is deterministic. Let Z
crit denote the
pseudorevenue earned on this run during time t, possibly 0. ΦPi maps [0,L
(j)
i ] to [0, r
(j)
i ] bijectively,
so we can set W crit to be the value in [0,L
(j)
i ] for which ΦPi(W
crit) = max{r(j)i −Zcrit,0}.
We now consider the run of the algorithm on the full setup with item i, which is dependent
on the realization of Wi. The following two claims from Devanur et al. (2013) generalize to our
multi-price setting.
1. Dominance: if Wi ∈ [0,W crit), then in the run with item i, item i gets matched.
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Proof: Since W crit >Wi and Wi ≥ 0, W crit > 0. Therefore, ΦPi(W crit)> 0. Thus ΦPi(W crit) = r(j)i −
Zcrit (as opposed to ΦPi(W
crit) = 0), and moreover since Wi <W
crit and ΦPi is strictly increasing,
ΦPi(Wi)< r
(j)
i −Zcrit. This implies r(j)i −ΦPi(Wi)>max{Zcrit,0}, since Zcrit ≥ 0. Thus on the run
with item i, either i is already matched before time t, or it is matched to customer t.
2. Monotonicity: Zt ≥Zcrit (regardless of the realization of Wi).
Proof: fix the realization of Wi. We compare two deterministic runs of the algorithm: one with
item i, and one without. We can inductively establish over t= 0, . . . , T that at the end of time t,
the set of unmatched items in the run with i is a superset of that in the run without i. Therefore,
in the run with i, since the algorithm is maximizing pseudorevenue over a superset of items, its
pseudorevenue Zt can be no less than Z
crit.
Now, conditioned on the realizations of Wi′ for i
′ 6= i, which determines the values of Zcrit and
W crit, we have Zt ≥Zcrit (by Monotonicity) and in turn Zcrit ≥ r(j)i −ΦPi(W crit) (by the definition of
W crit). Meanwhile, as long as i gets matched, Yi gets set to Φ
′
Pi(Wi), so by Dominance, E[Yi|{Wi′ :
i′ 6= i}]≥ ∫W crit
0
Φ′Pi(w)dw = ΦPi(W
crit)−ΦPi(0) = ΦPi(W crit). Therefore, E[Yi +Zt|{Wi′ : i′ 6= i}]≥
r
(j)
i . The proof follows from the tower property of conditional expectation. 
Appendix D: Deferred Proofs from Section 5
Proof of Proposition 4. The unique solution to the system (24) is obtained inductively over
j = 2, . . . ,m by setting Bj =
r(j−1)e−α
(j−1)
r(j)e−α(j)
Bj−1. By (35), r
(j−1)
r(j)
≤ e−α(j) , hence Bj ≤ e−α(j−1)Bj−1.
But α(j−1) > 0 by Proposition 1, completing the proof that Bj < Bj−1 for j = 2, . . . ,m. The fact
that 0<Bm is immediate. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider the execution of an online algorithm with this randomized arrival
sequence. For all i ∈ [n] and group of customers t ∈ [n], let Qt,i denote the number of group-
t customers to which item pii is sold, which is a random variable with respect to the random
permutation pi as well as any randomness in the algorithm. Let qt,i =E[Qt,i].
Clearly if i < t, then Qt,i = 0, because group-t customers have no interest in item pii. Otherwise,
for any i, i′ ≥ t, we argue that qt,i = qt,i′ . This is because while group t is arriving, the online
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algorithm cannot distinguish between items pii and pii′ , hence any items it allocates are equally
likely to be item pii and item pii′ . Therefore, we let qt denote the value of qt,i for i≥ t.
Now, consider item pin. Since it only has k units of inventory, we know that
∑n
t=1Qt,n ≤ k on
every sample path. Using the linearity of expectation, we get that
n∑
t=1
qt ≤ k. (46)
Furthermore, for a t∈ [n], on every sample path, ∑ni=tQt,i ≤ k, since there are only k customers
in group t. Therefore, (n+ 1− t)qt ≤ k, or
qt ≤ k
n+ 1− t . (47)
For this proof, let Mj =
∑j
j′=1 βj′ , for all j = 0, . . . ,m. For all j ∈ [m], let λj = 1k
∑Mjn
t=Mj−1n+1 qt.
Substituting into (46), we get the constraint that
∑m
j=1 λj ≤ 1. For any j ∈ [m − 1], summing
inequality (47) for t = Mj−1n+ 1, . . . ,Mjn yields λj ≤ ln BjBj+1 , since n→∞, and Bj = 1−Mj−1,
Bj+1 = 1−Mj by definition. It is also clear from definition that λj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [m].
Finally, the total expected revenue is
m∑
j=1
r(j)
Mjn∑
t=Mj−1n+1
qt(n+ 1− t), (48)
since for each group t there are n+ 1− t items for each of which qt copies are sold in expectation.
Consider any j ∈ [m]. Since ∑Mjnt=Mj−1n+1 qt = λjk by definition, ∑Mjnt=Mj−1n+1 qt(n+ 1− t) is maxi-
mized by setting qt to its upper bound in (47) for t=Mj−1n+ 1,Mj−1n+ 2, . . . until the capacity
of λjk is reached. Since n→∞, we can simply compute the value of t for which
k
n−Mj−1n + . . .+
k
n− t = λjk, (49)
with t ∈ [Mj−1n,Mjn]. Letting t = (Mj−1 + yβj)n with y ∈ [0,1], and using the definition of Bj,
(49) becomes ln
Bj
Bj−yβj = λj, or yβj =Bj(1− e−λj ). Therefore,
Mjn∑
t=Mj−1n+1
qt(n+ 1− t)≤
(Mj−1+Bj(1−e−λj ))n∑
t=Mj−1n+1
k
n+ 1− t · (n+ 1− t)
=Bj(1− e−λj )nk
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Substituting into (48), we get that the expected revenue of the online algorithm is at most (26),
where
∑m
j=1 λj ≤ 1, λj ≤ ln BjBj+1 for j ∈ [m− 1], and λj ≥ 0 for j ∈ [m], completing the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 5. We use backward induction over j =m, . . . ,1. When j =m, (28) becomes
nkr(m)Bm(1− exp(−τ)), since Am = α(m) by definition. Meanwhile, (27) is maximized by setting
λm = τ , resulting in the same expression and establishing the base case.
Now suppose j < m and that we have already established the lemma in the j + 1 case. If we
set λj = λ, for some λ ∈ [0, τ ], then the maximum value of (27) subject to λj+1, . . . , λm ≥ 0 and
λj+1 + . . .+λm ≤ τ −λ is, by the inductive hypothesis,
r(j)Bj(1− exp(−λ))nk+nk
m∑
`=j+1
r(`)B`
(
1− exp (−α(`) + Aj+1− (τ −λ)
m− (j+ 1) + 1
))
. (50)
Consider this expression as a function of λ. The derivative is
r(j)Bj exp(−λ)nk+nk
m∑
`=j+1
r(`)B` · −1
m− j · exp
(−α(`) + Aj+1− (τ −λ)
m− j
)
(51)
and the second derivative is clearly negative, so the function is concave. Therefore, it is maximized
by setting the derivative to 0. By definition (24), r(`)B`e
−α(`) is identical for all `= j + 1, . . . ,m,
and equal to r(j)Bje
−α(j) . Thus setting (51) to 0 implies:
exp(α(j)−λ) = 1
m− j
m∑
`=j+1
exp
(Aj+1− (τ −λ)
m− j
)
α(j)−λ= Aj+1− (τ −λ)
m− j .
Rearranging and using the definition that Aj+1 =Aj −α(j), we get λ= α(j)− Aj−τm−j+1 . Substituting
this value of λ into (50), the expression
Aj+1−(τ−λ)
m−(j+1)+1 is equal to
Aj−τ
m−j+1 , hence (50) is equal to (28),
completing the induction and the proof of the lemma. 
Appendix E: Deriving the Multi-price Value Function ΦP
In this section we explain how we optimized the value function ΦP for a given price set P, leading
to the system of equations in (7), and the functional form in (9). In Appendix E.1, we use the same
method to derive the optimal value function when the price of an item can take any value in the
continuum [rmin, rmax].
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Consider constraints (17)–(18) in Theorem 5 for a single item with k→∞. Let w = N
k
, and we
deterministically set Φ˜ to some Φ. The goal is to solve for the Φ which maximizes the value of F .
Observe that
lim
k→∞
k(Φ(
N + 1
k
)−Φ(N
k
)) = lim
k→∞
Φ(w+ 1/k)−Φ(w)
1/k
,
which is equal to the derivative of Φ as w, by definition (Φ will end up not being differentiable on
a discrete set of measure 0, which can be ignored). Therefore, (17) is equivalent to
Φ′(w)−Φ(w)≤ r(j)( 1
F
− 1), (52)
and needs to hold for all j ∈ [m],w ∈ [0,L(j)]. For a fixed w ∈ (L(j−1),L(j)), (52) needs to hold for all
j′ = j, . . . ,m, but is clearly binding when j′ = j. Therefore, it suffices to fix a j ∈ [m] and consider
(52) when w ∈ (L(j−1),L(j)).
We should point out that this simplification via the “binding” argument is not possible for a
finite k and random Φ˜, because then (52) becomes Φ˜′(w)− Φ˜(w)≤ r(j)
F
− Φ˜(L(j)), and the RHS in
fact may not be increasing in j. This is why we resort to first solving for Φ when k→∞ and then
defining Φ˜ as a random perturbation of Φ.
If we set (52) to equality for some j ∈ [m] and all w ∈ (L(j−1),L(j)), and solve the differen-
tial equation, we get that Φ(w) must be of the form Cew − r(j)( 1
F
− 1) on (L(j−1),L(j)). Setting
Φ(L(j−1)) = r(j−1) and Φ(L(j)) = r(j), we obtain
C =
r(j)− r(j−1)
eL(j) − eL(j−1) ;
F =
1
1− r(j−1)
r(j)
· (1− e−α(j)). (53)
The RHS of (53) is the largest value of F which allows (52) to hold on segment j. It is dependent
on α(j), which is equal to L(j)−L(j−1), the length of segment j. For (52) to hold on all segments
j ∈ [m], F must be set to minj 11−r(j−1)/r(j) · (1− e−α
(j)
).
Therefore, we would like to choose segment lengths α(1), . . . , α(m) summing to 1 to maximize the
minimum 1
1−r(j−1)/r(j) · (1− e−α
(j)
), which is accomplished by setting 1
1−r(j−1)/r(j) · (1− e−α
(j)
) equal
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for all j ∈ [m]. This yields the system of equations (7), and Proposition 1. The resulting value of F
is equal to 1− e−α(1) , since r(0) = 0. The resulting value of C, when substituted into the equation
for Φ(w) on each segment (L(j−1),L(j)), yields (9).
The derivation of Φ we just completed, starting from condition (52), comes from our analysis
of Multi-price Balance. We note that the exact same inequality (52) can also be derived from
our analysis of Multi-price Ranking, which shows that the same value function should be used
for both algorithms.
E.1. Continuum of Feasible Prices
Let the feasible price set for the item be [rmin, rmax], where 0< rmin < rmax. Using the same “binding”
argument, it suffices to maximize the value of F for which the following can hold:
Φ′(w)−Φ(w)≤ rmin( 1
F
− 1), w ∈ (0, α); (54)
Φ′(w)− Φ(w)
F
≤ 0, w ∈ (α,1). (55)
Φ must also satisfy Φ(0) = 0,Φ(α) = rmin,Φ(1) = rmax, while α ∈ (0,1) is an arbitrary “booking
limit” for the lowest price of rmin.
We know from before that under the optimal solution to (54), the value of F can be at most
1− e−α. Solving the differential equation where (55) is set to equality, Φ(w) must take the form
Cew/F on (α,1). Substituting Φ(α) = rmin and Φ(1) = rmax yields
C = (rmin)
1
1−α (rmax)−
α
1−α ;
F =
1−α
ln r
max
rmin
.
Therefore, the value of F is also bounded from above by 1−α
ln(rmax/rmin)
. F is maximized by setting
1−α
ln(rmax/rmin)
equal to the other upper bound of 1− e−α; the value at which equality is achieved is
then the competitive ratio.
Letting R= ln(rmax/rmin), the solution to 1−α
R
= 1− e−α can be written as W (ReR−1)−R+ 1,
where W is the Lambert-W function, the inverse function to f(x) = xex for x∈R≥0. Indeed, when
α=W (ReR−1), the following can be derived:
1−α
R
= 1− e−α
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Re−α = α+R− 1
ReR−1 = (α+R− 1)eα+R−1
W (ReR−1) = α+R− 1
Substituting α=W (ln(rmax/rmin)eln(r
max/rmin)−1)− ln(rmax/rmin) + 1 into the formula for C, and
using the fact that Φ(w) =Cew/F , we get
Φ(w) = (rmin)
1−w
1−α (rmax)
w−α
1−α , w ∈ [α,1].
Meanwhile, the earlier derivation implies that
Φ(w) = rmin · e
w− 1
eα− 1 , w ∈ [0, α].
It can be checked that indeed Φ(0) = 0, Φ(α) = rmin (Φ is continuous at w= α), and Φ(1) = rmax.
Furthermore, unlike the case of discrete prices, it can be checked that Φ is also differentiable at
w= α (on [α,1], use the form that Φ(w) =Cew/F , hence Φ′(α) = Φ(α)
F
).
Appendix F: Supplement to Numerical Experiments
We provide additional details about our choice estimation. We define 8 customer types, one for
each combination of the 3 following binary features.
1. Group: whether the customer indicated a party size greater than 1.
2. CRO: whether the customer booked using the Central Reservation Office, as opposed to the
hotel’s website or a Global Distribution System (for details on these terms, see Bodea et al.
(2009)).
3. VIP: whether the customer had any kind of VIP status.
We did not use features such as: whether the booking date is a weekend, whether the check-in date
is a weekend, the length of stay, or the number of days in advance booked. Such features did not
result in a more predictive model.
We estimate the mean MNL utilities for each of the 8 products separately for each customer
type. The results are displayed in Table 3. The total share of each customer type (out of all the
52
Table 3 MNL choice models for the 8 customer types. The suffix “L” on a room type means lower fare, while the suffix “H” on a
room type means higher fare.
Customer Type MNL Mean Utilities
Group? CRO? VIP? Share KingL QueenL SuiteL 2DoubleL KingH QueenH SuiteH 2DoubleH NoBuy
0.16 -0.36 -1.22 -2.56 -1.04 0 -0.23 -2.25 -1.8 0
X 0.03 -0.82 -1.98 -2.16 -2.09 0 -1.02 -1.45 -1.82 0
X 0.28 -1.67 −∞ -3.78 -2.71 0 -1.33 -1.8 -1.58 0
X X 0.09 -2.13 −∞ -3.38 -3.76 0 -2.12 -1 -1.59 0
X 0.19 -0.54 -0.97 -2.26 0 -0.91 -1.47 -2.78 -1.41 0
X X 0.04 -0.09 -0.82 -0.95 -0.14 0 -1.35 -1.07 -0.51 0
X X 0.18 -0.93 −∞ -2.56 -0.76 0 -1.66 -1.41 -0.27 0
X X X 0.03 -1.39 −∞ -2.16 -1.8 0 -2.45 -0.61 -0.28 0
transactions) is also displayed. We should point out that it is possible for a customer to choose the
higher fare for a room, even if the lower fare was also offered. This is because the higher fares are
often packaged with additional offers, such as airline services, city attractions, in-room services,
etc.
We have shifted the mean utilities so that for each customer type, the weights of both the
no-purchase option, and the most-preferred purchase option, is equal to 0. (We synthetically set
the weight of the no-purchase option because it is not possible to estimate from the data.) The
large weights on the no-purchase options ensure that the revenue-maximizing assortments tend to
include both the low and high fares.
In the setting with greater fare differentiation (Subsection 7.5), the high prices of the King,
Queen, Suite, and Two-double rooms are adjusted to $614, $608, $768, $612, respectively (twice
the lower fares). The mean utility of the no-purchase option is increased by 2 for every customer
type, to ensure that the revenue-maximizing assortments still include both the low and high fares.
F.1. Details on the Forecasting Bid-price Algorithms
To forecast the remaining number of customers, we assume that we know the average number
of customers interested in each occupancy date (1340), as well as the overall trend for how far
in advance customers book, which is plotted in Figure 4. As an example of how to use these
numbers, consider the occupancy date March 31st. At the start, we forecast there to be 1340
arrivals. However, suppose by March 6th, 500 customers have arrived. Since we know from Figure 4
that roughly 50% of the total population interested in March 31st will have already booked by
March 6th (25 days in advance), we expect there to only be 500 customers remaining.
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Figure 4 Distribution of arrivals over the days before check-in, formed by aggregating all trans-
actions.
To forecast the breakdown of remaining customers by type, we assume that we know the aggre-
gate distribution of customer type over all occupancy dates. For example, from Appendix F, we
know that 28% of all customers are of Type 3. Then we would estimate 28%×500 = 140 of the 500
remaining customers to be of Type 3. Alternatively, one can try to learn the specific distribution
of customers interested in March 31st. Suppose that only 100, or 20%, of the 500 bookings made
before March 6th came from customers of Type 3. Then we would instead estimate 20%×500 = 100
of the 500 remaining customers to be of Type 3.
To use the forecasted information, algorithms incorporate it into the LP (30), and set the bid
price of each item i equal to the shadow price of constraint i in (30b). These algorithms then offer
each customer t the assortment S (from the available items) maximizing
∑
(i,j)∈S p
(j)
t,i (S)
(
r
(j)
i −λi
)
.
We clarify the exact way in which the forecasted information is incorporated into the LP. Let
there be A customer types, indexed by a = 1, . . . ,A. We use p
(j)
a,i(S) to denote the probability of
a customer of type a choosing product (i, j) from assortment S. Suppose that when we want to
re-solve the LP (30), the forecasted number of remaining customers of type a is Na, for all a∈ [A],
and the remaining inventory of item i is Ki, for all i ∈ [n]. We can formulate the following LP,
which is a modification of (30):
max
A∑
a=1
∑
S
xa(S)
∑
(i,j)∈S
r
(j)
i p
(j)
a,i(S)
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A∑
a=1
∑
S
xa(S)
∑
j:(i,j)∈S
p
(j)
a,i(S)≤ ki i∈ [n]
∑
S
xa(S) =Na a∈ [A]
xa(S)≥ 0 a∈ [A], S ⊆ {(i, j) : i∈ [n], j ∈ [mi]}
We have set T =
∑A
a=1Na and |{t : type of customer t is a}|=Na; note that the ordering of remain-
ing customers is inconsequential for the LP.
Although this LP has an exponential number of variables, we can easily solve it using column
generation (e.g., see Liu and Van Ryzin (2008)). Fix an optimal primal solution (x∗a(S) : a∈ [A], S ⊆
{(i, j) : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [mi]}) and an optimal dual solution (y∗i : i ∈ [n]), (z∗a : a ∈ [A]). The bid-price
algorithm sets the bid price of each item i equal to y∗i .
We should point out that for every bid-price algorithm based on dual variables, there is a
corresponding random assignment algorithm based on primal variables. Such an algorithm would,
for each customer type a, offer each assortment S with probability proportional to x∗a(S). We have
confirmed that these algorithms perform similarly in the simulations. We compare with the bid-
price algorithms instead of the random assignment algorithms because they follow a form more
similar to our Multi-price Balance algorithm.
